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The Oxford Handbook of Social Psychology and Social Justice

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Social Psychology and Social Justice: Critical Principles and Perspectives for the Twenty-First Century

Phillip L. Hammack

Abstract

This introduction presents the concept of social justice as an idea (and ideal) linked to Enlightenment philosophies and their realization in modern democracies. The historical emergence of social psychology as a discipline is discussed in relation to twentieth-century movements for postcolonial independence and civil rights, the demise of the eugenics movement, and challenges to ideologies of ethnic hierarchy. Five principles of a social psychology of social justice for the twenty-first century are proposed, orienting empirical work toward (1) a critical ontological perspective, (2) assumption of a normative stance toward justice, (3) alliance with the subordinate, (4) analysis of resistance, and (5) commitment to public science and scientific activism. Chapters within the volume are situated in relation to six areas of inquiry: (1) critical ontologies, paradigms, and methods; (2) race and ethnicity; (3) gender and sexuality; (4) class and poverty; (5) globalization and conflict; and (6) intervention, advocacy, and social policy.

Key Words: social justice, social psychology, politics, critical ontology, critical psychology

On August 9, 2014, a young unarmed man was shot repeatedly—and fatally—in the chest by a police officer following an altercation, resulting in massive protests that awoke a community and a nation to the unfinished business of eradicating racial inequality. The young man was Michael Brown. He was African American, living in a predominantly African American community of Ferguson, Missouri, policed primarily by a white police force.

Two years later, in the summer of 2016, high-profile shootings of young African American men continued, with the deaths of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge and Philando Castile in Falcon Heights, Minnesota. Investigations in Baltimore and Chicago revealed a culture of endemic racism within the police force of those cities. The deaths of Black men continued to be better known than that of Black women such as Sandra Bland, Meagan Hockaday, Natasha McKenna, and many more,

revealing the way in which racism and sexism conspire to silence the experience of women of color (Crenshaw & Ritchie, 2015).

The deaths of Brown, Sterling, Castile, Bland, Hockaday, and McKenna, regrettably just some of so many similar incidents that have fueled the Black Lives Matter social movement, remind us that the work of social justice—of fairness and equality, of freedom from oppression and domination—endures. The quest to achieve equal rights, dignity, and access to resources across the lines of race, class, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, ability status, nationality, and other social identities endures. We psychologists, who uphold in our ethical code “the dignity and worth of all people” (American Psychological Association [APA], 2010, p. 4), have a moral imperative to use our science to contribute to this quest.

Emerging with the waning of eugenics ideology that had legitimized ethnic hierarchy (Frederickson,

1999), the growth of the desegregation movement in the United States (e.g., Clark, 1953), the moral clarity provided by the devastation of World War II and the Holocaust (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and the twentieth century quest for universal human rights and postcolonial independence (e.g., Fanon, 1961/2004), the subdiscipline of social psychology was born precisely out of a desire to contribute to social justice (see Morawski & Bayer, 2013; Ross, Lepper, & Ward, 2010). The early pioneers of social psychology sought to produce knowledge that could explain the pathology of injustice, whether it was Theodore Adorno and colleagues' (1950) landmark study to determine what makes an authoritarian, Gordon Allport's (1954) efforts to explain prejudice as a normal outgrowth of racial segregation, or Stanley Milgram's (1963) portrait of obedience to authority, even in the face of potentially lethal shock administration. Kurt Lewin, one of social psychology's founders, insisted that our science and our application and social relevance be ever intertwined, so that we may contribute not just to knowledge but also to the amelioration of social problems and the betterment of social relations (e.g., Lewin 1951). John Dollard (1937) and Marie Jahoda and colleagues (1933) revealed the psychological consequences of economic stress and injustice. These early social psychologists were actively involved in social change efforts, particularly in the case of desegregation, and the studies and testimonies of psychologists such as Kenneth and Mamie Clark proved highly influential in eliminating unjust, explicitly racist laws (Clark, 1953; see Fine, 2004).

Well over a half-century after these groundbreaking attempts of social psychologists to work for social justice and to promote a democratic society, injustice has entered a renewed era of heightened visibility and unabashed justification. Racism not only endures through implicit bias, it is manifest in open acts of violence. The rhetoric and open expression of white nationalism and other discourses of social exclusion were given new legitimacy with the election of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States in 2016. During the election, sexual assault and violence against women were excused and euphemized as "locker-room talk." The reprise of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism has rippled across the globe like a tidal wave, discrediting linear narratives of "progress" and shocking social and scientific activists (including most social psychologists) who have made it their life's work to advocate for equality and social justice.

The politics of the day and the historical events of the recent past should be a wake-up call for social psychology, whose enchantment with the cognitive revolution led many away from the study of pressing social problems (Gergen, 1989). The guiding thesis of this volume is that *a social psychology of the twenty-first century must reaffirm its role as a form of scientific activism working against injustice*—not simply producing knowledge with "implications" for the eradication of injustice, but rather using the tools of science to reveal the social and cultural devastation of ideologies and social structures that produce inequalities. We must interrogate both privilege and dispossession (e.g., Stoudt, Fox, & Fine, 2012; Weis & Fine, 2012). We must be clear, as Lewin, Allport, Milgram, Jahoda, Mamie and Kenneth Clark, and their contemporaries were, in our commitment to the values of social justice and the opposition to the legacies of authoritarian and ethnocentric ideologies. Our values are not sources of "bias" in the illusory quest for universal "truths." Rather, our values humanize our scientific practice and anchor it in a moral vision that maximizes human freedom and challenges the injustice of constraint (e.g., Smith, 1969). When kept firmly in our consciousness and fully acknowledged, our values enrich our attempts to analyze, critique, and influence the social world (Kelman, 1968).

How do we achieve this renewed mission? What role do or can we social psychologists assume today in the ongoing struggle for social justice around the globe? What paradigms, theories, and practices equip us to produce knowledge that can contribute to social change in the interest of justice and equality? The impetus for this handbook is a growing awareness that many of mainstream social psychology's paradigms and research practices are heavily disengaged from actual settings of injustice. We struggle with limited, clearly articulated alternatives to rarefied laboratory experimentation or to analytic approaches that eliminate personhood in favor of the study of variables. This erasure of the person as a central unit of analysis sends a message to budding social psychologists, who were probably drawn to the field out of a desire to study *people* rather than *variables*, that abstractions in the form of scientific laws are more important than understanding lived experience in social situations.

I am not advocating, nor does a social psychology of social justice require, that we abandon experimentation, quantification, or measurement, or that we give up on the aim of charting lawful regularities. (It seems likely that many exist, including the

universality of domination, oppression, and injustice.) But what social psychology needs at this juncture—at this time in which entire movements such as critical psychology, community psychology, participatory action research, and qualitative psychology have gained momentum but essentially created their own, sometimes marginal niches—is a blueprint for how to think about social psychology and social justice for a new century. This “new” century is one in which “old” problems such as racism, sexism, and heterosexism remain but a new consciousness about larger issues of inequality—particularly political and economic inequality in a context of cultural and economic globalization—has risen. There have been calls for psychology to become “less American” (Arnett, 2008) and less focused on “WEIRD” (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). A social psychology of social justice recognizes that injustice is a global phenomenon that commands a global lens to our theoretical and empirical work.

In this introductory chapter to the volume, I propose five critical principles to orient a social psychology of social justice for the twenty-first century. I first review the concept of social justice and its historic emergence from Enlightenment-era shifts in social organization and political and economic philosophy. I then further situate the history of social psychology as a distinct intellectual (and political) project founded upon social justice issues of the twentieth century. I present the five principles and discuss their embodiment in existing or potential empirical work and in other chapters in the volume. In the remainder of the chapter, I provide a conceptual roadmap to the volume, situating the contributions in larger areas of theory and research on social justice.

The Idea (and Ideal) of Social Justice

A concern for justice is central to the fabric of all human societies and has been since ancient times (Johnston, 2011). Ideas about justice prescribe the moral and cultural basis of human behavior, the nature of social relations, and the structure of all societies (Young, 1990). Shared notions of justice determine our conduct and our judgment of the conduct of others. They are integral to our formulation of the law and to our shared moral compass—simply put, what we as a collective view as “good” and “right” (e.g., Opatow, 2018). Notions of justice guide us toward a life of virtue, of character, of happiness within a polity (e.g., Aristotle, 1988).

Anchored in a view of the social world in which hierarchies between social groups were legitimized (e.g., slavery), early philosophers of justice tended to naturalize social inequality. For example, Plato saw inequalities as reflective of different capacities among groups. He viewed social positions (e.g., philosopher-rulers, soldiers, merchants) as rooted in natural endowments and justice as a matter of a harmonious social order in which members of each class conformed to their “natural” place in society (Johnston, 2011). Aristotle’s (1988) theory of distributive justice highlighted the relative status of parties engaged in an exchange of goods but never questioned the basis on which distinctions in status might be arbitrary or the product of historic domination of some groups over others.

An intellectual concern with justice was revived in the moral and political philosophy of the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment, but now with an explicit emphasis on private property and other concepts central to capitalism. For example, Hume (1739) emphasized the importance of private property in his treatment of justice and the social order. Smith (1776) argued that the central goal of societies ought to be the creation of wealth and that justice should be oriented toward this end. Bentham’s (1789) emphasis on laws and social policies that maximize the happiness of citizens, similar to Smith and other utilitarian philosophers, assumed a correlation between wealth and happiness. Kant’s (1781, 1785, 1797) deontological theory of justice rejected utilitarianism’s emphasis on happiness in favor of a view of justice that emphasized the rational, free, and agentic nature of human beings (see Johnston, 2011). Consistent with the idealism of other Enlightenment thinkers, Kant envisioned a strong state defined by a view of justice in which social relations of mutual respect and reciprocity thrive among free and equal citizens (Johnston, 2011).

Moral and political philosophers began to turn their attention explicitly to matters of *social* justice in the nineteenth century, as the growth of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution created new contexts for life, labor, and social relations. It was in this era that two competing political philosophies of justice emerged and continue to define our ideological horizon to this day. These competing philosophies diverged in their view of capitalism and its implications for social justice and human welfare. Nineteenth century philosophers who favored capitalism, such as Thomas Malthus (1804/2008) and Herbert Spencer (1892), viewed social justice

through a “principle of desert”—the idea that what individuals deserve to receive is based on what they contribute to society (Johnston, 2011). The ideology of meritocracy and the master narrative of the “American Dream” (Bullock, 2013), in which hard work is sufficient to secure significant social mobility for individuals, are linked to this principle. The larger social and economic structure of neoliberalism, which posits the benefits of private property, free markets, and free trade for individual and collective wellbeing (Harvey, 2005), can also be linked to the principle of desert.

By contrast, nineteenth century philosophers who challenged capitalism, such as Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (e.g., Marx, 1867/1992; Marx & Engels, 1848/2014), viewed social justice through a “principle of need”—best captured in the famous phrase, “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” attributed to nineteenth century scholar and activist Louis Blanc (Johnston, 2011). The critique of capitalism and the emergence of socialism and communism as alternative systems of social and economic organization catapulted a concern for social justice, particularly economic justice, to the forefront of global consciousness and inspired revolutions everywhere (e.g., Guevara, Luxemburg, Marx, & Engels, 2005). The basis for justice and equality was no longer intrinsically tied to one’s social position, as it was until the Enlightenment. Nor was it contingent upon one’s place in the process of material production, as it was in the minds of philosophers such as Spencer. Rather, human existence *in and of itself* warranted equality and dignity across communities. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these ideas became intrinsically linked to the struggle against not just economic injustice but also larger concerns with injustice on the basis of race (e.g., Wells, 2014) and gender (e.g., Addams, 1910).

Importantly, Marx linked capitalism and its construction of the material world according to mass production and commodification to the *psychological experience of alienation*, thus providing not only a political and economic treatise on the inherent injustices of capitalism, but also a deeply psychological one.

The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men [*sic*] that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.

(Marx, 1859/1973, p. 5)

Marx challenged inherited ideas about free will and individual liberty which formed the foundation for prior notions of justice, particularly in the Enlightenment, though it is noteworthy that he failed to fully interrogate the consciousness of elites. If the way in which individual thought and sentiment is experienced is fundamentally a *product* of social and economic organization, societies have an obligation to structure themselves in a manner that promotes justice and equality.

Marx’s emphasis on the power of the social and economic order to shape human consciousness forms the basis for contemporary perspectives on social justice that emphasize liberation from historical oppression (e.g., Freire, 1970/2000; Young, 1990). Social justice scholarship in social psychology interrogates the basis upon which (a) resources are distributed and available to diverse groups in societies (i.e., *distributive* justice; e.g., Deutsch, 1985), (b) decisions are made that affect groups (i.e., *procedural* justice; e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988), and (c) groups are included or excluded in visions of a larger moral community (i.e., *inclusionary/exclusionary* [Opatow, 1990, 2018] or *interactional* [Jost & Kay, 2010] justice). The emphasis on *groups* in these considerations of justice takes us out of the individualism of Enlightenment-era formulations and the abstraction of Rawls’s (1971) “original position” of equality into the concrete reality of historical domination (Young, 1990). Hence our ideas of social justice are informed by our historical understanding of oppression and domination (and, as I will suggest, our *explicit alliance with the subordinate*) and a critical perspective on the social structure of society. Central to current formulations of social justice is an analysis of power, for social justice requires a context of empowerment in which individuals and groups are fully capable of determining their destinies (e.g., Pratto, 2016; Rappaport, 1981; Zimmerman, 2000).

The idea of social justice that orients this volume thus centers *power, history, and social identity*. This *paradigm* of social justice takes as its point of departure the notion of a society characterized by a diversity of social groups, coexisting within a larger matrix of value and proximity to centers of power and authority within institutions, all of which has a history that shapes collective understandings of social relations at any given moment. This paradigm calls us to ask questions about the nature of power and social structure, the politics of various identities and their intersections, and shared understandings

or collective storylines about *how* and *when* these configurations emerged.

Anchored in notions of *fairness and equality* as central to justice (Rawls, 1971; Sampson, 1975), contemporary notions of social justice emphasize “full and equal participation of all groups in a society that is mutually shaped to meet their needs” (Bell, 2007, p. 1). Ideas legitimizing hierarchy and inequality in access to resources or opportunities for self-determination are repudiated.

Social justice includes a vision of society in which the distribution of resources is equitable and all members are physically and psychologically safe and secure. We envision a society in which individuals are both self-determining (able to develop their full capacities) and interdependent (capable of interacting democratically with others). Social justice involves social actors who have a sense of their own agency as well as a sense of social responsibility toward and with others, their society, and the broader world in which we live.

(Bell, 2007, pp. 1–2)

A society characterized by a commitment to social justice considers the well-being of all its inhabitants, uninhibited by the constraints of oppression and domination or the intimidation of authoritarianism. It is a society in which individuals and groups are free to express themselves and determine their own destinies, practicing an ethic of social responsibility.

In contrast to prior notions of justice that legitimized hierarchy (e.g., Plato) or inequality (e.g., Spencer), contemporary notions of social justice subscribe to a vision of cultural pluralism in which differences between groups are recognized, appreciated, and protected (e.g., Young, 1990). Social and economic success for all is linked to the extent to which groups in various societies are afforded “cultural liberty”—“the capability of people to live and be what they choose, with adequate opportunity to consider other options” (United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2004, p. 4). Conflict, protest, and war are all linked to grievances associated with oppression in all its forms—exploitation, marginalization, cultural imperialism, powerlessness, and violence (Young, 1990). A commitment to social justice necessitates a repudiation of oppression in all its forms and the creation of institutions that recognize and value group differences (Young, 1990).

This vision of social justice calls our attention to the *ideological basis* of political, cultural, and economic systems (e.g., capitalism, neoliberalism; see

Liboro, 2015); the *history* of these systems and their effects on particular groups (e.g., slavery, colonialism; see Salter & Adams, 2013); the *narratives and discourses* that sustain these ideologies (e.g., the American Dream, the Protestant work ethic; see Bullock, 2013); the *social psychological mechanisms* by which individuals and groups either reproduce or repudiate the status quo (e.g., conformity [e.g., Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004], system justification [e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2003], narrative engagement [e.g., Hammack, 2008]); and of course the *effects* of all these processes on the body, the mind, the “soul.” Social psychologists who anchor their work in a commitment to social justice produce knowledge at some place along this trajectory, interrogating the way in which individuals and groups maintain or challenge an existing social order through psychological mechanisms and processes.

With this vision of social justice in mind, in the next section I outline five principles to guide social justice research in social psychology in the twenty-first century. Some of these principles have been implicit in social psychological inquiry for some time. Others speak to a uniquely twenty-first century context, in which technology has forged new means of communication and the deployment of discourse. My aim here is to provide a synthesis of values and practices already in place but fragmented across the subdisciplines of psychology (and the social sciences more broadly) concerned with matters of social justice. Following an outline of these principles, I present a roadmap to the volume and the domains of injustice covered by contributors.

Principles of a Social Psychology of Social Justice

Principle 1: Critical Ontologies

The first principle of a social psychology of social justice proposes that research be anchored in a critical ontological perspective, taking as its orienting social theory a view of the subject as socially and historically constituted, always in relation to systems of power and domination (e.g., Foucault, 1982; see Hook, 2007; Yates & Hiles, 2010). This perspective, inspired especially by the work of Michel Foucault, recognizes that knowledge, institutions, and systems of authority that govern a society also regulate the psychology of lived experience, including the meaning of social categories such as the “insane,” the “prisoner,” or the “homosexual,” to name three social categories Foucault studied extensively (Foucault, 1965, 1977, 1978). A critical ontological perspective recognizes power

and knowledge as intimately connected to individual psychology and the enterprise of social psychology as part of the knowledge production industry that, with its scientific authority, might contribute to social *injustice* (as it did during the eugenics movement [Richards, 1997] or the period during which homosexuality was classified as a mental illness [Hammack, Mayers, & Windell, 2013; Herek, 2010], or more recently the participation of psychologists in torture [Opatow, 2007]) or to social *justice* (as occurred with desegregation [e.g., Clark, 1953; Fine, 2004], critical perspectives on colonialism [e.g., Fanon, 1961/2004], the eventual alliance with lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] people for rights and recognition [see Herek, 2018], and other examples). Situating social psychology within the critical human sciences (e.g., Foucault, 1970; Plummer, 2001; Polkinghorne, 1988) represents a first step to produce knowledge explicitly oriented toward social justice.

A critical ontological perspective allies social psychology more closely with other social science approaches that assume a stance of suspicion about the social world, rather than a faith in the social structure as reflecting some “natural” order (Teo, 2015; see Josselson, 2004). Inspired as well by critical social theory (e.g., Bronner & Kellner, 1989; Held, 1980) and the critical psychology movement (e.g., Fox, Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2009), both of which emphasize the link between ideology and knowledge production, this perspective brings social psychology into more direct dialogue with critical paradigms such as feminist standpoint theory (e.g., Harding, 2004), postmodern and post-structural social theory (e.g., Butler, 1990; Gergen, 2001), and social constructionism (e.g., Gergen, 1985). A social justice perspective supplants the traditional positivist or post-positivist epistemology with an interpretive, constructionist epistemology that views knowledge about the social world as inherently linked to power and history (Hammack & Toolis, 2016; see also Sampson, 1978).

A critical ontology for social psychology necessitates an acknowledgment of our scientific enterprise as essentially producing *historical knowledge* (Gergen, 1973), rather than the illusion that the knowledge we obtain possesses some kind of universal “truth” or lawful regularity. This paradigmatic distinction can be traced to the founding of psychological science in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when psychology’s early architects disagreed about whether psychology ought to be considered a “natural science” (e.g., James, 1890) or a “human science”

(e.g., Dilthey, 1894/1977). The former approach suggested a positivist epistemology in which the goal was to produce laws of human mental life and behavior that could be used for prediction and control. The latter approach suggested a hermeneutic or interpretive epistemology in which the goal was to produce knowledge about human meaning making in context, with the goal to *understand* the nature of mind and behavior in historical context (e.g., Josselson, 2004; Polkinghorne, 1988; Tappan, 1997). It is noteworthy but often unacknowledged that one of psychology’s revered founders, Wilhelm Wundt, advocated for *two distinct branches* of psychology—one which examined basic questions of perception and sensation using an approach informed by the natural sciences (*experimental psychology*), and one which examined questions of human social behavior in context using an approach informed by the humanities and social sciences (*cultural, or folk, psychology*) (Wundt, 1897, 1916; see Greenwood, 2003). Without question, positivism emerged as the dominant epistemology of psychological science for most of the twentieth century, and interpretivism was relegated to the sidelines until the end of the century, with the birth of narrative psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Cohler, 1982; McAdams, 1988; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sarbin, 1986).

Because it foregrounds the notion of mind and behavior as historically situated, a critical ontological perspective is better anchored in an interpretive paradigm for psychological science. Recognizing that social psychologists produce *historical knowledge* about the nature of mind and behavior in particular contexts (Gergen, 1973), an interpretive paradigm calls our attention to the relationship between self and society. Individuals are not conceived as self-contained units whose brains and bodies determine thought, feeling, or action. Rather, the individual is conceived as an active agent, *constrained by social structural forces* (including cultural ideologies that compel certain forms of identity and social practice; see Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Toolis, 2016). A critical, interpretive paradigm considers all forms of discourse and all forms of authority with suspicion, as it interrogates the way in which they link to systemic practices of oppression and domination.

How is a critical ontological perspective embodied in social justice research? First, it calls our attention to empirical observation beyond the unit of the “self-contained” individual (Sampson, 1988) or the micro-setting of the rarefied laboratory experiment (Gergen, 1978; Gibbs, 1979; Moghaddam & Harré, 1982). Social psychologists who take an

explicit social justice perspective look to the larger social world of cultural ideology, political rhetoric, master narratives and discourses deployed in cultural products (e.g., film, literature, propaganda). We consider not just an individual's expression of prejudice; we consider the cultural context in which ideologies that promote prejudice occur. We produce knowledge that reveals the injustice of that cultural context which *promotes* the perpetration of prejudice, not simply knowledge that pathologizes individual perpetrators of prejudice.

Second, a critical ontological perspective leads us to a suspicion of the social structure, with its matrix of social categories—tremendously influential for both social relations and the psychological life of the individual (e.g., Brewer, 2001; Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1978, 1981, 1982). Just as Foucault exposed the way in which social categories were not products of a “natural” order but rather constructed through discourses that were ultimately intended to control individual behavior (e.g., Foucault, 1978), social psychologists who embrace a critical ontology question the nature of social categories themselves (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Situationists and social identity theorists have produced research in social psychology that especially speaks to this phenomenon (e.g., Haney, 2005, 2006; Tajfel, 1981; Zimbardo, 2007), although explicit links between Foucault's ideas and these findings have rarely been acknowledged.

While the findings of canonical experiments in social psychology were originally interpreted to reveal propensities of human nature to collaborate in tyranny and violence (e.g., Milgram, 1963, 1974; Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, 2007), recent re-assessments have revealed the way in which participants were motivated by both *identification with leaders* (Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012) and a *faith in scientific authority* (Haslam, Reicher, & Birney, 2014; Haslam, Reicher, Millard, & McDonald, 2015). Not only do these new analyses reveal the way in which psychological science is itself inherently interpretive, its data always subject to the lens of the era and its favored paradigms (Kuhn, 1962); they critically reveal the way in which individual and collective action are linked to an identification process with existing forms of authority, particularly in the form of narratives individuals internalize about the nature of reality (e.g., *science is a force for good; men in white lab coats are to be trusted*). Social psychologists concerned with social justice benefit from a lens that views identity and discourse as suspect, for it is precisely our historic acceptance of social categories as indicative of some

“natural endowment” that led to complicity in pernicious ideologies such as racism, sexism, and heterosexism throughout most of the twentieth century (Hammack et al., 2013). In a critical ontological frame, we do not accept what is “given” in the social world as the way things “ought” to be. Rather, we interrogate the way in which discourses *about* social categories—discourses with which individuals are in constant engagement as they make meaning of their own personal and social identities (Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Cohler, 2009; Hammack & Toolis, 2016)—produce forms of subjectivity that either reproduce or repudiate an unjust social order.

To return from theoretical abstraction to a critical problem of the moment—the reprise of authoritarianism and white nationalism—a social psychology of social justice considers the social and historical context in which these ideologies have regained momentum. It examines the way in which discourses are deployed to activate social psychological processes of identification, obedience, conformity, prejudice, and violence. It seeks to expose the strategic use of language and emotion to influence the masses. It mobilizes insights and ideas from decades of social psychology and related disciplines to return to the original questions that motivated the enterprise from the start. How do rational human beings, with faith in the ideals of law and democracy, embrace ideologies of exclusion? Like situationists and social identity theorists, we look to the social structure and to the strategic deployment of discourse to position ideologies and social categories in relative states of authority. We then look to the individual and the way in which ideologies and discourses are internalized. The explicit embrace of a critical ontological perspective on the self-society dynamic affords just such a mode of inquiry—desperately needed in the current era.

Principle 2: Assumption of a Normative Stance

... The claim to a value-free science ... only obscures the value elements in the choice of problem, of research setting, of conceptual framework, in the decision as to when to rest with negative findings, when results are reportable, and so on endlessly. Only if we know what we are choosing, only if the values involved in our choices are explicit, do our decisions become responsible ones.

—(Smith, 1969, p. 357)

The second principle I suggest ought to guide the social psychology of social justice in the twenty-first century is a simple one in need of little elaboration. Social psychologists have long studied the role of *norms* in human behavior and intergroup relations (e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1991; Sherif, 1936). We have long interrogated the way in which individuals and groups develop standards of thought and action to provide meaning and order to collective life. But we ourselves are also guided by norms as social scientists. We have developed our own common standards of practice to guide our scientific enterprise and our production of knowledge about the social world. We often speak of our norms in terms of epistemology, methodology, or basic scientific practice, but as a community of scholars we also share a *normative stance* about the social world. We share a vision—sometimes utopian—of the ideal configuration of social relations. We study social processes such as prejudice, stereotyping, authoritarianism, conformity, and conflict—always with implicit or explicit statements about the value of these processes. We teach about Milgram's obedience experiments and the Stanford Prison Experiment with, just as those researchers positioned their findings, shock and awe at the dark directions a social context can take the individual, away from morality and reason. *We constitute our own moral community.*

Social psychology emerged at a time of war and crisis on both domestic and global fronts in the twentieth century (De Vos, 2010; Morawski & Bayer, 2013; Ross et al., 2010). Colonialism, racism, and ideologies of ethnic hierarchy proliferated in the early days of the discipline. Far from a neutral scientific enterprise, social psychology was part of a cultural movement to resist these pernicious ideologies and their consequences for the social structure. Decisions to focus on phenomena such as authoritarianism, prejudice, conformity, and intergroup relations did not occur in a cultural vacuum but rather came from individuals deeply committed to a more just and democratic world (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Lewin, 1948; Milgram, 1963; Pettigrew, 1961; Tajfel, 1981).

In the twenty-first century, social psychologists continue to work on many of the same problems, yet too often we are reluctant to acknowledge the scientific activism that propels us. I propose that we “come out” from behind the veil of old, discredited notions of scientific “objectivity” (Haraway, 1988) and embrace our collective stance against injustice and oppression in all its forms. We reject the notion that social psychology ought to be somehow

ideologically “balanced” or “neutral” or that our endeavor somehow benefits from “political diversity” (Duarte et al., 2015). This notion is premised on a view that denies the politics of all knowledge production and *hence favors those with greater power*. The social world is not ideologically neutral but rather is the product of historical forces characterized by power asymmetries. The version of psychological science promulgated by eugenics-oriented clinical and personality psychologists, for example, supported a status quo of sexism, racism, and heterosexism throughout much of the twentieth century (e.g., Hammack et al., 2013; Richards, 1997; Shields, 2007; Shields & Bhatia, 2009). Social psychology came to explicitly repudiate the complicity of science with oppressive ideologies over the course of the twentieth century. And so it is difficult to comprehend recent calls for enhanced “political diversity” (Duarte et al., 2015) within the field, given that social psychological science has been an explicitly *political* project from its inception.

Sampson's (1978) compelling perspective on paradigms in social psychology reveals its contemporary relevance in this matter. (It is noteworthy that this article is routinely rated by my first-year doctoral students in their entry proseminar as their favorite reading.) Sampson (1978) argues that conceptions of science possess *value orientations* and that psychology has been divided between two paradigms with conflicting value orientations: the *natural science* model, and the *historical* model, harkening again back to psychology's founders and the divisions between James's “natural science” and Dilthey's “human science” conception. Sampson (1978) suggests that the natural science (or “Paradigm I”) model is infused with values of “liberalism, individualism, capitalism, and male dominance” (p. 1335) because of the historical era of its emergence (when these values were unchecked in the dominant cultures of Western science). The historical science (or “Paradigm II”) model views all social knowledge as context-dependent and hence always culturally and politically embedded:

... Scientific facts and scientific truths, as with all other forms of knowledge, are said to be historically generated and historically rooted. In this view, psychological truth is not something naturally occurring “out there” to be grasped, but rather is something that is dynamic, constituted in and through the particular encounters between persons in concrete sociohistorical settings.

(Sampson, 1978, p. 1334)

It should come as no surprise that the version of social psychology I advocate—and the version represented in the contributions in this volume—is situated in Sampson's (1978) "Paradigm II." We reject the notion that social psychology benefits from political diversity or ideological neutrality because we recognize that the basis of social injustice is political and ideological. Social justice is not morally relative. It is guided by fundamental notions of fairness, equality, and recognition to which we subscribe as scientists or producers of knowledge. Our shared goal is not a prestigious science, viewed from the outside as producing context-free "Truth." Rather, our shared goal is a just society—to be sure, a legacy of the Enlightenment project, and thus inherently political. We use the tools of science and rigorous historically informed inquiry to contribute to that end, comfortably allied with a "liberal progress narrative" (Smith, 2003; see Duarte et al., 2015).

What does the assumption of a normative stance against injustice look like in our empirical research? In many ways it only calls us to amplify what is sometimes implicit in our writing and in our other forms of scientific communication. A social psychology of social justice recognizes that a strong and explicit stance against injustice enhances our ability to work for social justice (Kelman, 1968; Smith, 1969), for it clearly positions us as allied with the subordinate.

Principle 3: Alliance with the Subordinate

In the nineteenth century, a new social category or "type of person" emerged from the medical and scientific discourse. With the unification of Germany out of the former Prussian Empire, existing legal codes pertaining to sexual behavior began to come into conflict. A small movement of sex law reformers and scientists created a new vocabulary to understand sexual diversity when they invented the terms "homosexual" and "heterosexual" to describe distinct types of people (Bullough, 1979; Katz, 2007). With this discursive invention came a whole new social category—the homosexual—taken out of the realm of the criminal and into the world of medicine, science, and culture (Foucault, 1978).

Since this innovation in language and social categorization, psychology has gradually come to explicitly ally itself with the social and psychological well-being of sexual minorities (Hammack & Windell, 2011). But it was not always so. For most of the twentieth century, psychologists conspired to maintain the subordinate, marginalized

status of individuals with non-heterosexual desires and identities (Hammack et al., 2013). While psychoanalysts dedicated their careers to "treating" the homosexual and seeking a "cure" for their "ailments," most psychologists studied the use of tests to detect members of this often invisible population (Minton, 1986). Common psychological tools such as the Rorschach were re-envisioned for a purpose for which they were never intended: to detect the "deviants" (Hegarty, 2003).

It would take a disciplinary insider, using the established tools of science and the very ideas about the power of psychological tests to detect mental illness, to begin to mobilize psychological science for the betterment, rather than continued subordination, of sexual minorities. Evelyn Hooker's (1957) highly influential study revealed that expert assessors of clinical tests could not distinguish between groups of male homosexuals and heterosexuals. The results were interpreted to mean that male homosexuality in and of itself did not constitute psychopathology and that homosexuality ought to be considered a "normal" form of sexual diversity. It would take well over another decade for homosexuality to be removed from psychiatry's diagnostic manual, and hence from the vocabulary of mental illness, now cast by scientific authority as a *legitimate social identity* rather than a *diagnosable mental condition*. Yet this step was absolutely essential to the eventual move toward social justice for sexual minorities (Bayer, 1987; Minton, 2001).

The story of Evelyn Hooker is the story of a scientific activist whose personal alliance with the stigmatized community of homosexuals motivated her to use her scientific authority for social justice (see Hooker, 1993). Herself heterosexual, it was Hooker's personal relationships with gay men and lesbians (and in particular a former student of hers who was gay and introduced her to the gay community of Los Angeles in the 1950s) that motivated her to take the enormous cultural and professional risk to conduct a series of studies (including an ethnographic study; Hooker, 1967) that explicitly challenged the cultural and scientific authority of the day. Through her engagement with a non-clinical community of sexual minorities, it was plain to Hooker that homosexuality did not inherently compromise psychological functioning. (Alfred Kinsey assumed a very similar role to Hooker, though he is more identified with sociology than psychology; see Minton, 2001.) Rather, it was society's treatment of sexual diversity that created problems for homosexuals.

Like Evelyn Hooker in her time, social psychologists today face a choice as we interrogate injustice: How do we use the tools of science to work for social justice, always allying ourselves with those who experience injustice, oppression, subordination? As a field, our alliance with the subordinate is typically implicit. When we study racial prejudice against African Americans, we are taking a stance against racism and its social psychological manifestation. But are we serving the interests of the subordinate, or are our scientific practices more concerned with our own personal and professional interests to achieve success, tenure, and the like? A social psychology of social justice must do more than produce knowledge that reveals the endurance of racism among “perpetrators” or the psychological toll of racism among “victims.” A genuine alliance with the subordinate requires that we consider their social interests. What kind of knowledge do *they* need to work for their emancipation from cultural and structural violence?

Here we return to epistemology and methodology, for the constraints of convention in social psychological research can conspire to keep our alliance with the subordinate confined or limited. The methods of a social psychology of social justice benefit from a grounding in the interests of the subordinate, as we ask ourselves *for whom* our production of knowledge may be “of use” (Fine, 2006; Fine & Barreras, 2001). Kurt Lewin (1946), one of the discipline’s founders, argued for a type of “action research,” famously proclaiming that “research that produces nothing but books will not suffice” (p. 35). He outlined a formula for inquiry in social psychology, one which grounds our scientific practice in the needs of the communities whose interests we serve. His legacy on this front is apparent with the emergence of participatory action research (PAR) as a whole paradigm for empirical work in its own right (e.g., Brydon-Miller, 1997; Fine et al., 2003; Fine & Torre, 2004; Fox et al., 2010; Lykes, 1997; Torre, 2009; Torre, Fine, Stoudt, & Fox, 2012). The explosion of qualitative methods in psychology, the data of which preserves the voices of subordinate group members and hence provides narrative data that can be used as compelling evidence of the deleterious effects of social injustice (e.g., Frost, 2018; Frost & Ouellette, 2004, 2011) or of the meaning of social activism (e.g., Dutt & Grabe, 2014; Grabe, 2017; Stewart, Lal, & McGuire, 2011), also speaks to an alliance with the subordinate. Interpretive and participatory methods probably better reflect a commitment to the interests of the subordinate,

for they more directly involve those experiencing injustice in the formulation of research questions and designs and they seek to understand the meaning of subordination in context (see Tolman & Brydon-Miller, 2001).

This principle suggests that our alliance with the subordinate be explicit in every aspect of the research process and that we use the tools of science to work for the interests of the subordinate. In practice, this principle suggests that we derive our research questions and construct forms of strategic communication of our findings in collaboration with subordinate groups. Our professional identities and practices are thus characterized not by a measured detachment from the populations we study. Rather, we recognize that detachment in the illusory notion of “scientific objectivity” is neither desired nor possible. We embrace our positions as *privileged actors* whose institutional and cultural roles as academics or scientists afford us social capital that can be harnessed to the benefit of the subordinate. This is precisely the role Evelyn Hooker played as a central figure in the movement for social justice for sexual minorities. And whether we are members of the subordinate group or allies (as Hooker was), insiders or outsiders, we embody our commitment to social justice through our practice as researchers.

Principle 4: Analysis of Resistance

In the standard introductory course in social psychology, we typically present a key finding of Milgram’s (1963) classic obedience experiments to an awe-struck audience of undergraduates, experiencing their own peak of expressive individualism at the start of emerging adulthood (Arnett, 2000; Arnett, Ramos, & Jensen, 2001): *nearly two-thirds of subjects blindly obeyed the experimenter to administer lethal shocks to the “learner.”* When we discuss Asch’s (1955) classic line-segment study, we also tend to emphasize the shocking number of subjects (75%) who, in a basic perceptual judgment task, yield to the social pressure of the group, illustrating the cognitive allure of conformity. In classic studies of prejudice and authoritarianism, there is a historic emphasis on the *perpetrator* and the pathology within his/her/their (typically his) psyche (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950). When we discuss the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney et al., 1973), we detail with horror how “John Wayne” was able to so easily rally the other subjects assigned as prison guards to engage in sadistic, denigrating practices. As Haslam and Reicher (2012) rightly note, there is a relative emphasis on the triumph of tyranny in human

social life, at the cost of recognizing the possibility for liberation realized through *resistance*.

Social psychology has, as a field, done an excellent job of constructing narratives that reveal the “darker” side of human nature and group life. This narrative is anchored in a social reality of deep cultural anxiety about the psychological dangers of the “crowd”: the notion that the “group mind” contaminates individual reason and that social life brings with it increased risks for moral behavior (e.g., Freud, 1921/1959; Le Bon, 1895/1969; Reicher, 1996). It should come as no surprise that this narrative is anchored in the origins of social psychology at the time of rising nationalism and ethnocentrism in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which culminated in two devastating world wars (e.g., Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). This narrative is central to the birth and mission of social psychology as a distinct scientific enterprise. It provides us with our sense of meaning, purpose, and value.

An emphasis on the perpetration of injustice gradually led us to the study of the *victims* of injustice. We documented and continue to document the lived experience of unjust ideologies, such as racism (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1950; Salter & Adams, 2013), sexism (e.g., Bem, 1993; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), heterosexism (e.g., Herek, 1990; Meyer, 2003), classism (e.g., Fine & Burns, 2003; Lott, 2012), and the like. This intellectual project is vital for social psychologists, for it provides us with ample evidence from which to argue for social and political change. As Frost (2018) suggests and as Herek (2018) illustrates in this volume, evidence of the experience of injustice is extraordinarily compelling when it comes to matters of legal change. Court decisions on desegregation and marriage equality, to name just two major US Supreme Court decisions in which social psychologists played a significant role, directly cite evidence of psychological impact on differential treatment (e.g., Adams, Biernat, Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008; Fine, 2004; Frost & Ouellette, 2004; Hammack & Windell, 2011).

While an emphasis on perpetrators and victims is sensible and has served the ends of social psychology well, our science of social relations and social change is incomplete if we restrict our analyses to these two categories of actors. We need also to consider the role of *resisters*. In the somewhat arbitrary division of labor among the social sciences, the study of resistance, namely in the study of social movements, found its disciplinary home in sociology

(e.g., Polletta & Jasper, 2001). I join a growing chorus of social psychologists to argue that the analysis of resistance must come to the foreground of a complete social psychological science (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012). We have to understand not just how injustice is committed (the study of perpetrators) or how injustice gets “under the skin” (the study of victims; e.g., Hatzenbuehler, 2009). We also have to understand how injustice is resisted and the role of resistance in achieving social justice. To illustrate briefly by returning to the story of Evelyn Hooker, the scientific activism in which she and others engaged to remove homosexuality from the manual of mental disorders likely could not have been achieved without the major resistance movement organized by gay, lesbian, and other queer people at the time (e.g., Bayer, 1987; Minton, 2001).

The analysis of resistance has occurred in many forms, largely on the sidelines of mainstream social psychology. Unger’s (1998) notion of *positive marginality* gives us one valuable paradigm through which to think of resistance (see also Mayo, 1982; Unger, 2000). Unger (1998) argues that members of historically subordinated groups who adopt a positive view of marginality, rather than seeing marginality or subordination as a source of “damage,” might be more likely to engage in social activism to work for social justice. This phenomenon has since been documented by social psychologists who study activist identity development (e.g., Dutt & Grabe, 2014; Hall & Fine, 2005), but the experience of positive marginality can be viewed as both psychologically and socially beneficial even when it does not lead to activism (e.g., de Vries, 2015), for resistance to the potential contaminating effects of stigma and subordination is itself a tool for social change. As Tajfel and Turner (1986) famously argue in their treatise on social identity theory, the redefinition of the meaning of social categories (e.g., “Black is Beautiful,” “Gay Pride”) represents a potential mechanism for status change in intergroup relations.

Social psychologists have increasingly turned their attention to the psychological processes at play in developing resistance. Of particular value in this endeavor has been Freire’s (1970) notion of *conscientization*, adopted by liberation psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró (1994) as a guiding framework for a new psychological paradigm in Latin America. *Conscientization* refers to a psychological process of increasing awareness of injustice, along with action to work for liberation from oppression. Similar to the notion of *sociopolitical development*

(Watts, Williams, & Jagers, 2003), *conscientization* speaks to the development of consciousness-raising in relation to systems of domination and oppression long discussed in feminist social psychology (e.g., Hurtado, 1989, 1996, 2003). In my own work, I have suggested that *narrative identity development* can be a tool to construct emancipatory life stories that challenge an unjust status quo (e.g., Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Toolis, 2016). For example, many contemporary same-sex attracted youth construct personal narratives that challenge existing conventional categories of gender and sexual identity, resisting an inherited matrix of social identities to forge new possibilities for social and erotic life (e.g., Adams, Braun, & McCreanor, 2014; Hammack & Cohler, 2011; Hammack, Thompson, & Pilecki, 2009; Savin-Williams, 2005).

The study of resistance has also occurred among social psychologists who study collective action in the social identity tradition. Reicher (2004) argues that social identity theory has often been misinterpreted to focus on processes of intergroup discrimination, while Tajfel (1978) intended the theory to be concerned with “the possibility of change” (Reicher, 2004, p. 931). Here identities are seen as “projects” that “render collective action possible” (Reicher, 2004, p. 935). If the great (oversimplified) revelation of social identity theory was that mere categorization is sufficient to activate ingroup bias, Reicher (2004) argues that we ought to see the construction of social categories as opening up spaces for resistance. In other words, the key insight is not about bias but rather the ease with which identities can be constructed and potentially mobilized toward collective action. A key project in resistance is thus the strategic construction of identity and its use to advocate for social and political change: “Perhaps the major strategy through which those we have termed ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ seek to shape collective action is to define the meanings of group identity such that their proposals can be seen as the implementation of group norms” (Reicher, 2004, p. 937). In this frame, identity or group life more broadly need not be viewed through the historic “dark” lens of fears of the herd or the “group mind” (e.g., Freud, 1921/1959) but rather through the lens of resistance and social change. Identity is not necessarily a *burden* but can rather be a *benefit* in the quest for social justice (Hammack, 2010b).

As Reicher (2004) argues, “tyranny is always balanced by revolt, even in the most extreme circumstances” (p. 941). Hence it was especially fitting that Reicher and Haslam (2006) returned to the

Stanford Prison Experiment to illustrate the need to balance an emphasis on tyranny with the analysis of resistance in social psychology. In their BBC Prison Study (BPS), Reicher and Haslam (2006) discovered that, absent the leadership role that the experimenters assumed in the original experiment (Zimbardo, 2007), prisoners were able to effectively resist the authority of the guards. They illustrate how the descent into tyranny is not inevitable and how a subordinate group can resist through their own collective solidarity (see also Haslam & Reicher, 2012). This study has not been without its critics (namely Zimbardo [2006] himself, who noted problems with the simulation to replicate a prison system, among other critiques). But the important takeaway is that social identity theory provides us with a vocabulary to not just understand the perpetration of injustice but also resistance against it. Hence as a paradigm, it calls our attention to the analysis of resistance as a vital part of the social process toward justice and equality.

Here my intent is not to suggest we ought to cease study and analysis of either perpetration of injustice or its lived experience through its victims. Rather, echoing the calls of many of my colleagues, I want to suggest that our scope expand to center the analysis of resistance. In so doing, we recognize social structures and systems as always in a dynamic state of reproduction *and* repudiation (Hammack, 2008, 2011a; Hammack & Toolis, 2015). By joining sociologists in the systematic study of resistance, we offer a potentially vital contribution to the psychological factors and processes central to challenging an unjust status quo.

Principle 5: Commitment to Public Science and Scientific Activism

W.E.B. Du Bois, Kurt Lewin, Marie Jahoda, Gordon Allport, Kenneth and Mamie Clark, Brewster Smith, Herb Kelman, Tom Pettigrew, Evelyn Hooker, Morton Deutsch, Phil Zimbardo, Craig Haney, Aída Hurtado, Ignacio Martín-Baró, Michelle Fine, Heather Bullock, Greg Herek, Ilan Meyer, Anne Peplau. What these individuals share, beyond a relation to social psychology (even if it was not their primary disciplinary “home”), is that they did more than produce knowledge about the injustices of the world; they used their evidence and their authority as experts to work directly for social and political change. Du Bois, Allport, the Clarks, Smith, Pettigrew, and others altered not just the cultural conversation on racism, prejudice, and segregation; some of them provided testimony that directly

impacted the US Supreme Court's 1954 ruling that ended segregation (see Adams et al., 2008; Fine, 2004). Jahoda in her time and Bullock today have provided both data on the lived experience of economic injustice and also strove to have this knowledge make a difference. Bullock was a Congressional Fellow with the US Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (Democratic Office). She worked with Senator Edward M. Kennedy's office on policies related to poverty, food insecurity, youth violence, and early childhood education. In 2014, she gave a congressional briefing on the psychological consequences of poverty and economic inequality. Based on their lessons from the Stanford Prison Experiment, Haney and Zimbardo (1998) argued for major reforms in US prison policy. Haney's testimony before the US Senate in a 2012 hearing helped reform solitary confinement practices across the country, and his testimony in another case was cited as critical to the US Supreme Court's decision requiring California's prisons to drastically reduce widespread overcrowding. The testimonies of Herek, Meyer, and Peplau were all cited as critical to the 2010 decision to overturn California's Proposition 8, which had banned same-sex marriage in the state (Hammack & Windell, 2011). Michelle Fine has dedicated her distinguished career to working for education reform in our nation's public schools, revealing the "circuits of dispossession" that law, policies, and institutional practices create to obstruct the success of working-class students (e.g., Fine, 1991, 2013; Fine & Ruglis, 2009). These are only a handful of examples, scattered across more than a century of social psychological science, that illustrate what I want to suggest is a vital principle for social psychologists committed to social justice.

Inspired especially by the work of Michelle Fine, María Elena Torre, and colleagues at the City University of New York (CUNY), and harkening back to calls to "give psychology away" (Miller, 1969), I suggest that a fifth and final principle of a social psychology of social justice is an explicit commitment to *public science* and *scientific activism*. At every stage in our process of knowledge production and dissemination, we ought to consider how our research and expertise might become best positioned to serve the public interest for justice and equality—to fully be "of use" to those who experience injustice (Fine & Barreras, 2001). We must craft research questions rooted not in the disciplinary fetishes of the day but rather in the concrete reality of those individuals and groups affected by

injustice. We must leave the "ivory tower" (or in my case the stunning redwoods) for inspiration about how we might be of service to the public. And of equal importance, we must use rigorous methods that address the nature of the question to be answered, not methods that might perhaps be given greater weight in some (inaccessible) scholarly journal or narrow-minded community of peer reviewers (see Fine, 2006).

To be clear, my view is that we must produce scholarly work in authoritative sources such as journals and books, for that is how we obtain the credibility of expertise to actually have legitimate social influence. But I suggest we develop questions and utilize methods that serve the interest of our larger goal for social justice (Fine, 2006). In one case, numeric evidence obtained through quantitative surveys may be of greatest value, as in the "Polling for Justice" project where youth have used community surveys to map the experience of injustice in education, family life, and policing (Torre et al., 2012). In another, narrative evidence obtained through ethnographies, interviews, or focus groups may be of more value and carry more weight to our intended audience beyond the academy (Frost, 2018; Frost & Ouellette, 2004, 2011). What is key is that our scientific *practices* be aligned with those experiencing injustice in such a way as to work for *their* benefit and to expose the link between social structure and psychological injustice (Martín-Baró, 1994; Weis & Fine, 2012).

I borrow Fine, Torre, and colleagues' use of the term *public science* to describe this envisioned commitment to a form of inquiry that can best serve the end of social justice. Although CUNY's Public Science Project and numerous other examples in social and community psychology are grounded in a specific methodology—namely, critical participatory action research (critical PAR; Torre & Fine, 2011; Torre et al., 2012), a public science approach can be embodied in many forms. Hooker's (1957) pathbreaking study of gay men took the form of a quasi-experiment. Haney's long career of research in prisons has variously used ethnographic, interview, and survey methods (e.g., Haney, 2005, 2006), and of course his original work in this area took the form of a laboratory experiment (Haney et al., 1973). The key point here is that we align our scientific practices with the communities whose interest for social justice we intend to serve, much as the community self-survey movement of the twentieth century had done (see Torre & Fine, 2011; Torre et al., 2012). Our inspiration comes not just from

these contemporary examples of empirical work but also from our renewed collective memory of social psychology's longstanding commitment to being a social science in the public interest.

Beyond a commitment to serving the public, I recommend an embrace rather than a fear of constructing *activist identities*. Social activism as a concept often evokes forms of social practice beyond the academy—the picket line, the corporate boycott, the rally, the march. But science can be an invaluable tool for activism, for it uses the established tools of knowledge production to take us beyond ideology, toward the incontrovertible *facts* of rationally derived evidence. Science only produces “alternative facts” when it has been contaminated by ideology, as was the case with the eugenics movement (Richards, 1997). The notion that science and politics are somehow disconnected—particularly *social science*—has been discredited (e.g., Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1986), so if we fail to name or intentionally silence our identities as aspiring change agents, engaged in productive activity intended to upend an unjust status quo, we may unintentionally be complicit in maintaining inequality. At the very least we risk muting our voices, thwarting the possibility of genuine leadership in movements for social change. As the stories of so many of our colleagues reveal—Du Bois, Hooker, Haney, Clark, Fine, to name just a few—it is perfectly possible to hold the identities of *scientist* (or *scholar*, if one prefers) and *activist* simultaneously.

Interrogating Injustice: A Roadmap

My intent in charting these five principles is to provide a common vocabulary for the paradigm that has already emerged in psychological science—a paradigm with a long history but a renewed relevance. This paradigm is *critical* of the relationship between self and society, sensitive to *power* and its impact on personhood, mindful of the *privilege* of authority we hold as scholars, committed to the production of knowledge *useful* in the quest for social justice. The chapters in this volume speak directly to how we might embody this type of paradigm. Here I briefly chart the major content areas of the volume, situating these contributions in perspective.

Historical, Theoretical, and Conceptual Foundations

Social psychologists who seek to embody a commitment to social justice in their work must first

have a comprehensive understanding of the concept of “social justice” and its use in related disciplines, namely moral philosophy, politics, legal studies, and history. The first part of the volume seeks to achieve this end, through both this introductory chapter and Susan Opatow's (2018) chapter on social justice theory and practice.

Exceptional reviews of social psychology and social justice theory and research exist elsewhere (e.g., Jost & Kay, 2010), and so our intent in this first section of the volume was not to recapitulate those but rather to offer this set of principles as a generative guidepost for emerging scholars of social psychology and social justice. Opatow's (2018) contribution reviews the key ideas of social justice in social psychology, distinguishing among *distributive*, *procedural*, and *exclusionary/inclusionary* justice. She then applies a social justice lens to issues of the environment. Issues of environmental justice in social psychology are relatively new but incredibly important as we consider the link among social policy, health, and lived experience (e.g., Riemer & Van Voorhees, 2014). Opatow (2018) uses the concept of the *scope of justice* to explain how injustices become legitimized by placing individuals and groups outside the vision of a moral community, a process Opatow calls *moral exclusion* (originally suggested by Ervin Staub in a symposium, as noted in Opatow, 1990). This area of theory and research, which Opatow has led for decades (e.g., Opatow, 1990, 1993, 2007, 2012) is incredibly useful for social psychologists to understand the perpetration and legitimization of injustice in many domains (e.g., Pilecki, Muro, Hammack, & Clemons, 2014).

Opatow (2018) offers not just a review of models of social justice and their application (in this case, to the issue of environmental pollution). She also appropriately invokes three political philosophers—Martha Nussbaum, Wendy Brown, and Iris Marion Young—to offer insights into how social justice research can live up to its potential for social change. Nussbaum's capabilities framework, for example, highlights how the unjust distribution of resources limits the social and psychological possibilities of entire classes of people. Young provides guidance to would-be activists on how to influence deliberative processes—for example, through the use of creative means such as images, poetry, cartoons, marches, and the like. Opatow argues that social psychologists must engage with these other disciplinary perspectives on justice to gain insights into effective activity for social change.

Critical Ontologies, Paradigms, and Methods

As the principle of critical ontologies suggests, a social psychology of social justice benefits from paradigms and methods that highlight the relationship between social structure and lived experience. Weis and Fine (2012) offer the concept of *critical bifocality* to “render visible the relations between groups to structures of power, to social policies, to history, and to large sociopolitical formations” (p. 173). In practical terms, what they call a “bifocal design” documents “the linkages and capillaries of structural arrangements and the discursive and lived-out practices by which privileged and marginalized youth and adults make sense of their circumstances” (p. 176).

The concept of critical bifocality is among the paradigmatic lenses we might call upon as we anchor the empirical work of documenting injustice and its resistance. And of course there are others. Social identity theory has long offered a way of linking concepts of social status and categorization with self and behavior in social interaction (e.g., Reicher, 2004; Tajfel, 1981). Feminist psychologists have always foregrounded issues of power and inequality in the analysis of women’s lives in context (e.g., Eagly & Riger, 2014). Certain forms of narrative psychology integrate analysis of both personal and “master” narratives (i.e., compulsory storylines about group history and identity; Hammack, 2008, 2011b; Hammack & Toolis, 2016). An inherently critical subdiscipline, community psychology has long offered a set of concepts and methods to understand the link between social injustice and psychological experience (e.g., Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2005).

The second section of the volume offers two contributions that speak to issues of paradigm and method in the social psychology of social justice. Langhout and Fernández (2018) draw our attention to a relatively underappreciated but incredibly relevant concept in our current time—that of *citizenship*. The idea of citizenship is key to social justice, for it provides the legal and moral basis for the treatment of individuals in society. Drawing on a vast literature in diverse fields such as political science and feminist studies, Langhout and Fernández (2018) detail models of citizenship and their implication for justice. They are particularly critical of conceptions of citizenship in the context of neoliberalism, in which notions of the “good citizen” are linked to the individual’s contribution to labor and material production. The bulk of the chapter proposes a

focus on *cultural citizenship* among social psychologists who study social justice. Cultural citizenship refers to a set of practices, rather than a particular legal status in the traditional models of citizenship. It is practiced when individuals mobilize to construct a community, a shared identity, and rights and recognition within a society. Langhout and Fernández (2018) provide an agenda for research and action through the paradigmatic lens of cultural citizenship, pressing social psychologists to look beyond matters of individual, interpersonal, or intergroup dynamics, toward the way in which individuals and groups engage in social practice to realize social justice.

As one of the architects of psychology’s “cognitive revolution,” Jerome Bruner (1990), describes in his landmark *Acts of Meaning*, the “proper study” of human life foregrounds issues of personal and cultural meaning. Part of the “narrative revolution” in psychology of the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Cohler, 1982; Josselson, 1996; McAdams, 1988, 1996; Mishler, 1999; Polkinghorne, 1988; Sarbin, 1986; Tappan, 1997), Bruner’s treatise revitalized a hermeneutic paradigm for psychological science grounded in the analysis of lived experience once envisioned by Dilthey (1894/1977) at the dawn of the discipline. The aim was not, in contrast to the naïve positivism of behaviorism, to *predict* and *control* human behavior but rather to *understand* the meaning of social acts. In Bruner’s (1990) own words,

A culturally sensitive psychology . . . is and must be based not only upon what people actually *do*, but what they *say* they do and what they *say* caused them to do what they did. It is also concerned with what people *say* others did and why. And above all, it is concerned with what people *say* their worlds are like. (p. 16; italics in original)

The new version of psychology Bruner envisioned was one in which verbal accounts of meaning making in context become primary sources of analysis in their own right. Like other early narrative psychologists, Bruner viewed the human capacity to use language to construct intentional social worlds as a fundamental feature of human development (see also Cohler, 1982; McAdams, 1988), as well as a key mediator in the process of social stasis and change (see Wertsch, 1991). This view of language, culture, and development has been enormously influential across several subdisciplines of psychology (see Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Hammack & Toolis, 2015).

In his contribution to this section of the volume, Frost (2018) argues for the vitality of what he calls *narrative evidence* in the quest for social justice. Following Ouellette's (2008) treatise on critical personality psychology, Frost argues that documenting and communicating the meaning individuals make of "opportunity inequity" provides compelling evidence that can be mobilized for social and political change. While hegemonic forms of psychological science have often privileged quantitative evidence and assumed that decision makers would be inherently compelled by numbers, the reality is that the *human stories* provided by narrative evidence can be quite persuasive to many in power. Frost (2018) highlights the way in which his own research program on a key social justice issue—the recognition of same-sex relationships—created narrative evidence revealing the injustice of inequality for same-sex couples (e.g., Frost, 2011; Frost & Gola, 2015). Among other key findings, Frost discovered that narratives of same-sex couples revealed similar themes of intimacy compared to opposite-sex couples. However, narratives of same-sex couples revealed themes of stigma, prejudice, and discrimination, highlighting the way in which social injustice for same-sex couples (namely, the lack of cultural and legal recognition during the era of prohibition of same-sex marriage) created unique psychological stressors. As Herek (2018) notes in his later chapter in the volume, evidence of the psychological impact of inequity was key to the unique voice psychologists could assume in the legal fight for same-sex marriage.

A social psychology of social justice requires paradigms and methods that can work toward the goal of challenging oppression and inequality (Fine, 2006). These paradigmatic statements on cultural citizenship and narrative, respectively, offer just two of many possible lenses through which to frame social psychological research for social justice. The remaining chapters in the volume deal largely with *domains* of injustice.

Race, Ethnicity, Inequality

"... [T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line," as the luminary African American social scientist and public scholar, W.E.B. Du Bois, so aptly stated at the start of his landmark 1903 volume, *The Souls of Black Folk* (p. v). Indeed social psychology as a discipline came to be defined over the twentieth century precisely with its efforts to address this problem—more than an abstraction for social science, a lived reality for

the many racial and ethnic minorities whose very being challenged the history of white supremacy in the United States and across the globe, gradually escaping the exploitation of European colonialism throughout the century (Fanon, 1952/1967, 1961/2004). Du Bois's (1903/1996) early analysis of the psychological legacy of slavery and the experience of racism was inspiring, poetic, and prescient. His notion of *double consciousness* ("this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity," Du Bois, 1903/1996, p. 2) evokes this lived experience of "problematized" existence as a person of color in a world defined by white supremacy.

The ideology of ethnic hierarchy that defined and legitimized oppressive social systems such as exclusionary nationalism, slavery, and colonialism reached its apex with World War II. The atrocities of the War created a new world order, not just *politically* (e.g., the rise of US and Soviet dominance, the formation of new institutions such as the United Nations) but also *scientifically*, as social science disciplines consolidated their commitment (some more gradually than others) to a new ethic of cultural pluralism. Cultural anthropologists such as Franz Boas (1911), Ruth Benedict (1934), and Margaret Mead (1928) had already sought to use the tools of science to illustrate the benefits of diversity, at times romanticizing cultural difference, but intellectually committed to documenting diversity and promoting its benefits to societies. As already noted, the founders of social psychology and their subsequent generations of students all took the value of pluralism and the repudiation of ethnic hierarchy for granted, as they charted the detriments of racism, authoritarianism, prejudice, and the like on perpetrators, victims, and society at large (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; Clark, 1953; Lewin, 1948; Milgram, 1963).

While at times there were moments in which this larger narrative of scientific consensus against racism may have been questioned (most notably in problematic studies of intelligence differences among different racial groups; e.g., Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1969), a commitment to cultural pluralism and intergroup harmony has characterized psychological science from the mid-twentieth century until today. It should, then, cause both alarm and a healthy dose of self-critique that we witness the extraordinary endurance of racism across the globe, the resurgence of the kind of exclusionary nationalism (including in the United

States) that ignited all of the wars of the prior century, the erosion of faith in science to work for the common good, and the proliferation of propaganda designed to delegitimize the vital institutions of democracy—including science and media. Across the globe there are renegade resisters of this tyrannical trend—artists, scientists, activists, and some brave political leaders. In this new context of explicit racism, this renewed effort to reclaim white supremacy and condone new forms of colonialism, we need a new social psychology of race and racism—one that takes us out of the overly cognitive realm of implicit bias (important as that line of inquiry is, of course), back into the fray of *explicit* racism, which had never really faded to the extent many social scientists had proposed anyway (Leach, 2005).

The five chapters in this section of the volume speak to a new approach to the social psychology of race and racism in the twenty-first century—an approach which links social psychology more directly to the field of critical legal studies and to a more complete understanding of the relationship among race, identity, and power. Cristian Tileagă has been a vital contributor to the social psychological study of race and racism in Europe, especially among the Roma—an ethnic group that has long been persecuted across the continent (e.g., Tileagă, 2005, 2006, 2007). He has especially highlighted the use of *discourse* and other cultural artifacts to delegitimize groups in multicultural Europe. Engaging closely with sociology and anthropology, Tileagă (2018) proposes that our study of racism be characterized by *critical analysis*—an approach that views prejudice and racism as part of a larger cultural system intended to reify power asymmetries, rather than an individual psychological phenomenon. This position, as Tileagă notes, has emerged strongly in social psychology largely outside of North America (e.g., Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012). These and other social psychologists have increasingly challenged the notion that prejudice is simply a “cognitive” problem that can be addressed at the individual or interpersonal level (see also critiques of contact theory; e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). Tileagă’s notion of critical analysis proposes that social psychologists move out of the lab and into the field, taking from other social science disciplines a rigorous approach to the study of culture and social structure.

Chapters by Stephanie Fryberg and colleagues (Fryberg, Covarrubias, & Burack, 2018) and William Cross (2018) return to the North

American context to posit new forms of inquiry in the study of racial minorities in the United States. In their very title, Fryberg and colleagues (2018) challenge the illusion that the colonization of indigenous people in North America is a phenomenon of the past. They illustrate the way in which colonialism endures through the denigration of indigenous people’s cultures, identities, and practices in North America. They invoke the notion of a *culture cycle* to describe the mutual constitution of selves and societies, arguing that historic and ongoing colonization of indigenous people interrupts an existing culture cycle, creating tremendous psychological risk for healthy development. Colonization endures in the social representations of indigenous people in the media (largely invisible), as well as the formal educational system constructed originally by the colonizers themselves. Modeling a particularly laudable form of social *practice* for social psychologists, Fryberg and colleagues do not simply theorize or document the injustice against indigenous North Americans. Rather, they propose a theory of culture change and illustrate one attempt to *decolonize* not just individual minds but cultural contexts themselves. Social justice for Native Americans cannot be achieved absent the *legitimization* of their cultures, which can occur through concrete changes in educational practice and policy that better “match” with traditional cultures. They offer an extended discussion of their attempt to decolonize the school context in the psychological interest of its indigenous students.

Cross’s (2018) critical review of research on Black identity and social justice challenges several narratives of the impact of slavery and racism on the psychological development and well-being of African Americans. His expansive treatment of historical, psychological, and other social scientific literature reveals a “disjunction” between the potential contamination of oppressive social systems and the actual evidence of resilience and thriving among many Black people. I take Cross’s challenge to suggest that the relationship between injustice and psychological experience is not simple or uniform, and it should not be necessary to highlight psychological “damage” in order to argue for racial justice. (There is an important parallel here to the role psychologists sought to play in the legal battle for same-sex marriage; see Herek, 2018; Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2004). In an argumentative thread that runs throughout the volume, Cross suggests that social psychologists reconsider the narrowness of traditional experimental methods to

interrogate phenomena such as racial preferences in the real world.

A key tenet of a more critical approach to race, ethnicity, and culture is that the terms we use to describe difference across human communities are themselves subject to analysis (e.g., Gjerde, 2004). Our science becomes more “complete” when we ask not just about psychological experience in particular cultural settings or of individuals embodying particular identities but rather also about the *meaning of cultures and identities* themselves (see Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). Cross’s chapter, for example, problematizes the tendency to expect that race itself is a marker of psychological distress. Okazaki’s (2018) chapter on culture and social justice among Asians and Asian Americans offers a critical perspective on the use of the culture concept itself among psychologists to produce essentializing notions of culture and ethnicity (see also Gjerde, 2014).

As Okazaki (2018) argues, psychological approaches to the study of Asians and Asian Americans have overly homogenized the experience of a vast diversity of cultural groups. While the emergence of cultural psychology has been tremendously important for psychological science to recognize its historic narrowness (e.g., Arnett, 2008; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder, 1990; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993), Okazaki’s analysis echoes prior critiques of the reductionism of mainstream cultural psychology (e.g., Bhatia, 2007a, 2007b; Gjerde, 2004; Hammack, 2008) and calls for a new paradigm for cultural psychology that can better serve the interest of social justice for Asians and Asian Americans. She proposes that we diversify our concept of culture in psychology through transdisciplinary dialogue, expand our methods (especially through the use of narrative methods; see Hammack, 2010a), and diversify the knowledge production process itself by recognizing the implicit bias toward Europe and North America in journals. Okazaki’s (2018) argument is thus comprehensive in its critical interrogation not only of the way in which Asians and Asian Americans have been represented in psychological science, but also of the reifying potential of an uncritical approach to social categorization (including concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) and the enduring hegemony of Euro-American scholars and epistemologies.

The final chapter in this section of the volume continues to interrogate simplistic notions of race and ethnicity, providing a primer and vision for the adoption of an *intersectional* perspective in social psychology. One of the earliest treaties on what we

now call *intersectionality* was penned by social psychologist Aída Hurtado (1989), whose pathbreaking work has brought social psychology (and social identity theory in particular) in direct dialogue with feminist theory (e.g., Hurtado, 1996, 1997, 2003; Hurtado & Gurin, 2004). In her classic essay, Hurtado (1989) begins with this vital observation: “Each oppressed group in the United States is positioned in a particular and distinct relationship to white men, and each form of subordination is shaped by this relational position” (p. 833). The crux of her argument is that, because white women and women of color hold different positions in relation to white men, their experiences of privilege and subordination are distinct. The meaning of womanhood is distinct, then, for white women experience the allure of seduction, “. . . persuaded to become the partners of white men . . . accepting a subservient role that meets the material needs of white men” (Hurtado, 1989, p. 845). Because women of color cannot provide white men with “racially pure offspring,” they are ultimately rejected by white men and viewed merely as “workers and as objects of sexual power and aggression” (p. 846). Hurtado (1989) notes that class position likely plays a role in these dynamics as well, with working-class white women more distant from the epicenter of white male power.

Ideas of intersectionality importantly call our attention to *power* and *identity* in a way that reflects the complexity of lived experience and responds to calls to center the study of power in social relations (e.g., Apfelbaum, 1979). Linked to the emergence of critical race theory (CRT) in legal studies (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991), intersectionality highlights the way in which individuals are always positioned in relative places of power on account of their *multiple* social identities (Cole, 2009; Hurtado, 2018). Psychologists have increasingly documented the way in which intersections of race, gender, class, sexual identity, and other statuses or identities locate individuals distinctly in their relation to privilege. For example, Coston and Kimmel (2012) illustrate the ways in which class (i.e., working class), sexual orientation (i.e., gay), and disability status challenge the privilege typically inherent in masculinity.

Hurtado’s (2018) chapter proposes an intersectionality paradigm for social psychological research that traces its origins to both social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1981) and borderlands theory (e.g., Anzaldúa, 1987), providing an invaluable sense of historical continuity to the concept. Hurtado’s (2018) *expansion* of the intersectionality concept

beyond Crenshaw's (1989) original focus on race and gender is important, for it speaks to the multiplicity of social identities individuals may hold at any given point in time. Hurtado (2018) calls these "master statuses" of sexuality, class, ethnicity, and physical ableness. Bringing intersectionality more closely into dialogue with social identity theory is a great service to social psychology, for social identity theory was intended to describe the way in which status and hierarchy were negotiated through both intrapsychic processes and intergroup relations (Reicher, 2004). Hence both paradigms are worthy of consolidation as they both foreground notions of power. Borderlands theory, articulated by Anzaldúa (1987), expands upon Du Bois's (1903/1996) notion of double consciousness. Anzaldúa (1987) invokes the physical concept of the border between Mexico and the United States to characterize the psychological experience of Chicanas growing up on the border, their *mestiza* consciousness providing them with a special tolerance for ambiguity and eroding the sense of "subject-object duality that keeps her a prisoner" (p. 102).

Hurtado's (2018) unique linkage of these theoretical perspectives opens up new ways of thinking about the lived experience of intersectionality and inequality. As she notes in her conclusion, intersectionality does not privilege one social identity over another. In an ever-diversifying US cultural landscape, in which identity pluralism has become a norm, intersectionality reveals that holding multiple group identifications is possible but that particular constellations of intersectional identities can have different implications for the experience of inequality. But with this experience comes opportunities for political coalition building, opportunities for individuals who inhabit particular configurations of social categorization to use identity to work for social change (see Hammack, 2010b). Hurtado (2018) thus invaluablely links the contemporary concern with intersectionality to longstanding theoretical considerations in social psychology and social justice (e.g., Tajfel, 1981).

Gender, Sexuality, Inequality

The subordination of women represents perhaps the most enduring evidence of systematic injustice over the course of human history. Patriarchy—the social system and accompanying ideology that privileges male authority and social power (e.g., Walby, 1990)—continues to characterize most societies, codifying inequality in culture, custom, and law (Ridgeway, 2011). Early psychological science,

rooted in a eugenics paradigm of intelligence, contributed to hierarchical thinking about the sexes and legitimized gender-based inequality (Bem, 1993; Eagly, 1995; Shields, 2007), largely ignoring research conducted by women that suggested structural explanations for sex differences (e.g., Hollingworth, 1914; Woolley, 1903; see Furumoto & Scarborough, 1986). Over the course of its disciplinary history, psychology gradually came to repudiate sexism and patriarchy and to recognize the way in which women's experience and development may be psychologically distinct (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Weisstein, 1968/1993) and the way in which structural disadvantage impacts women's identity and development (see Eagly, Eaton, Rose, Riger, & McHugh, 2012).

In her pathbreaking book, *The Lenses of Gender*, Sandra Lipstiz Bem (1993) reveals the way in which the scientific study of gender contributed to the subordination of women by legitimizing sex differences in bio-essentializing terms. In a prescient treatise calling us to reconsider how we frame the debate on sex inequality, Bem (1993) argues for *gender neutrality* and the eradication of *gender polarization*. She seeks to expose the way in which gender is a social construct, reified in science, politics, and law, designed to maintain patriarchy and androcentrism. I highlight this work because it represents a vital (and extremely successful) attempt to link psychological science and feminist theory, revealing the way in which our discipline had conspired in the subordination of women. And although queer theory had not yet made inroads into psychology at time of Bem's (1993) writing, her analysis is highly compatible with queer theory's more radical tenets about the socially constructed and performative nature of gender (see Balzer Carr, Ben Hagai, & Zurbriggen, 2017).

The late 1980s to early 2000s also witnessed several important new lines of inquiry that reoriented the study of women's lives toward an interrogation of the psychological consequences of inequality. For example, Fine (1988) argued that anti-sex rhetoric and the problematic nature of sex education in public schools conspired to exacerbate social and psychological vulnerabilities of adolescent females, especially those in low-income communities. Fredrickson and Roberts's (1997) objectification theory provided a vocabulary for psychologists to link the cultural construction of women's bodies through the heterosexual *male gaze* to the psychological experience of perceiving oneself as an object (i.e., *self-objectification*). They illustrated the way

in which problems in women's health and development can be traced to objectification. Following Fine's (1988) call to study adolescent females' sexual desire directly, Tolman and Szalacha (1999) revealed the way in which the social location of adolescents impacted how they talked about desire (see also Tolman, 2002). They found that urban girls described sexual agency "in the service of protection" (from AIDS, pregnancy, and reputation), while suburban girls described sexual agency "in the service of pleasure" (a more internal conflict about the management of desire). Glick and Fiske (2001) complicated perspectives on sexism by distinguishing between hostile and benevolent sexism, which represent complementary justifications for gender inequality.

By the end of the twentieth century, psychology had thus come to reconcile its own sexist and patriarchal past to provide paradigms through which to understand women's lives in the context of continued subordination and inequality. This critical perspective on sex and gender included an underlying theory of subjectivity (consistent with the principle of *critical ontologies*) as rooted in power, constrained by the historic asymmetry between men and women and the use of a bio-essentializing discourse in psychology itself that contributed to sex inequality (Bem, 1993). The social psychology of sex and gender was now characterized by a *normative stance* toward gender equality (i.e., the subordination of women is unacceptable; patriarchy is a problematic cultural ideology) and an explicit *alliance with the subordinate* through the production of knowledge intended to benefit women's lives (e.g., Tolman, 2002).

Two of the three chapters in this section of the volume expand upon these perspectives on gender and social justice. Abigail Stewart has been a key intellectual architect of feminist psychology and the use of empirical methods to study women's lives in context (e.g., Stewart, 1980; 1994; Stewart, Cortina, & Curtin, 2008; Stewart & Ostrove, 1998; Stewart & Winter, 1974, 1977). Her work not only assumes a critical ontological perspective and a normative stance toward social justice, it has also examined an analysis of resistance through the study of social activism on a global scale (e.g., Stewart et al., 2011). Stewart and Zucker's (2018) chapter takes as its point of departure the notion that psychological well-being is directly connected to one's location in the social structure, fully embodying the principle of critical ontologies. Policies, laws, and cultural practices that place women in a subordinate

position are detrimental to women's psychological well-being and development—an unacceptable outcome in a society that strives for justice and equality. Anchored in canonical perspectives in feminist psychology, Stewart and Zucker (2018) illustrate the way in which women's social positions limit or enable their physical and psychological well-being, focusing on experiences with discrimination, workplace harassment, and sexual and self-objectification. Importantly, they anchor their analysis in a framework of *human rights*, arguing that structural forces that negatively impact women's health and psychological well-being violate women's basic human rights.

In a similar vein to Stewart and Zucker (2018), Grabe (2018) frames contemporary social justice issues for women through the lens of human rights. She connects women's psychological well-being to issues of political and economic justice by linking social psychological and transnational feminist perspectives. Grabe (2018) details a paradigm for the study of women's social justice in global perspective, anchored in the experience of grassroots activists working for gender equality and thus foregrounding an analysis of resistance. This analysis follows her empirical work revealing the link between land ownership and enhanced social and psychological well-being among women in numerous cultural contexts (e.g., Grabe, 2010, 2012; Grabe, Dutt, & Dworkin, 2014; Grabe, Grose, & Dutt, 2015).

Grabe (2018) argues that a transnational feminist liberation psychology offers an ideal paradigm through which to study social justice issues for women on a global scale. A key goal of this paradigm is to document existing grassroots efforts intended to work for women's human rights, using methods that privilege marginalized women's perspectives (e.g., narrative methods; see Grabe, 2017). Importantly, Grabe (2018) notes that social psychologists engaged in this work must practice reflexivity by being fully aware of the power imbalances that exist between scholars and grassroots activists. Successful scholar-activist partnerships require recognition of power asymmetries and a commitment to the production of knowledge that will serve the interest of the oppressed. Taken together, Stewart and Zucker's (2018) and Grabe's (2018) contributions provide a new generation of social psychologists with key paradigms through which to interrogate gender injustice. Both contributions embody several of the critical principles I have proposed in this chapter, committed to a critical perspective on

selves and societies, a normative stance toward justice, an explicit commitment with the subordinate, and an analysis of resistance.

Patriarchy is a cultural ideology that legitimizes gender inequality, but it is just one of the many pernicious ideologies associated with gender and sexuality that conspire to subordinate certain groups. *Cissexism* (e.g., Bauer & Hammond, 2015; Serano, 2007) and *heterosexism* (e.g., Herek, 1990, 1996; Szymanski & Mikorski, 2016) also represent oppressive ideologies that create and legitimize social and psychological injustice. Perhaps the lesser known of the two (but increasingly recognized), *cissexism* refers to the ideology that one's *natal sex* (i.e., sex assigned at birth) invariably corresponds to one's *gender identity*. Much as heterosexism once falsely conceived that opposite-sex attraction was the norm of healthy development, the expanding literature on transgender identity reveals this assumption to be incorrect (e.g., Levitt & Ippolito, 2014a, 2014b), but society lags far behind our knowledge of the distinction between sex and gender. Cissexism creates a context in which *transphobia*—the outright denigration of transgender people—thrives. Evidence is growing on the link among cissexism, transphobia, and structural and direct violence against transgender people, with implications for their health and well-being (see Hughto, Reisner, & Pachankis, 2015).

One point of regrettable silence in the current volume is the absence of a dedicated chapter about transgender justice. Social psychology has lagged behind other branches of psychological science (namely clinical and counseling psychology) in its inquiry into the transgender experience (see Levitt & Ippolito, 2014a, 2014b). It is my hope that a new generation of social psychologists will expand the study of gender inequality beyond the traditional focus on cisgender women to consider injustices based not just on sexism but also cissexism and transphobia. Particularly in the context of the numerous legal battles now in play (the fates of which remain unknown in the Trump era), social psychologists ought to assume a central role in documenting and analyzing the experience of injustice for transgender people, much as we ultimately did with the study of homophobia and sexual prejudice (e.g., Herek, 2009).

In contrast to cissexism, heterosexism has received considerable treatment in the social psychological literature since the declassification of homosexuality as a mental illness in 1973 (e.g., Herek, 1990; Rothblum & Bond, 1996; Szymanski

& Mikorski, 2016). Adrienne Rich's (1980) classic treatise on *compulsory heterosexuality* as an ideological system that constrained women's lives and supported patriarchy offered a key frame through which to link sexual ideology and lived experience. Social psychologists in the 1980s situated the study of homophobia within the larger literature on prejudice, thus recognizing it as equally problematic as racism to a healthy society (e.g., Herek, 1987). Herek's (1990) defining essay on cultural heterosexism and anti-gay violence argued that direct violence against sexual minorities could be linked to the cultural ideology that privileged heterosexuality and denigrated other forms of intimacy.

Meyer's (2003) minority stress theory provides the larger conceptual framework through which we have come to understand the link between prejudice and health for sexual minorities. He argues that a cultural context of heterosexism creates *structural disadvantage* for sexual minorities (e.g., workplace discrimination, lack of access to revered cultural institutions such as marriage) which in turn increases the likelihood of experiencing prejudice events that can trigger minority stress processes such as expectations of stigma and rejection, concealment, and internalized heterosexism or homophobia. These processes mediate the link between prejudice and health and mental health outcomes, and factors such as sexual minority community involvement and a positive sexual minority identity can moderate these associations (e.g., Bruce, Harper, & Bauermeister, 2015; Wong, Schrage, Holloway, Meyer, & Kipke, 2014).

Minority stress theory has become the dominant paradigm through which several disciplines, including psychology and public health, view the experience of sexual minorities. As already noted, both Herek and Meyer testified in the legal case that overturned California's ban on same-sex marriage, and their testimony along with other scholars was cited as key in the court's decision (Hammack & Windell, 2011; Herek, 2018). Similar to the work of Stewart and Zucker (2018), the link these scholars make between social structure and psychological well-being provides a compelling scientific basis from which to argue for social justice through *structural change*.

One of the great social justice achievements of the past decade has, in fact, been the major structural change in the lives of sexual minorities, with the US Supreme Court's 2015 decision that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right. While it would be premature to suggest that this major legal breakthrough has signaled the end of heterosexism and

homophobia, it does begin to challenge the premise of minority stress theory. If same-sex intimacy becomes folded into the range of “normal” human behavior, as Hooker (1957) so long ago argued, what are the implications for the social and psychological lives of sexual minorities?

Langdrige (2018) offers a compelling, critical account of where this process of “normalization” of same-sex desire and sexual minority identity may lead. He challenges conventional scholarship in psychology on sexual minorities, positing a “benevolent heterosexism” that favors the assimilationist wing of the queer movement (see Stein, 2012). For those outside the larger queer community, this perspective may not only be very new; it may also be perplexing and disruptive. The important point to consider is that the movement for sexual liberation has long been split between those who favor inclusion in the existing social structure through access to institutions like marriage, and those who favor the adoption of a queer culture and identity as a form of critique of normativity in all its forms (e.g., Warner, 1999). One of Langdrige’s (2018) important points is that psychological research on sexual minorities has favored the assimilationist branch of the movement in part by neglecting documentation and analysis of what we might call the *resistance* branch of the movement. In other words, the dominant emphasis on documenting both the “equivalency” of same-sex and opposite-sex relationships and the effects of exclusion from heteronormative institutions has neglected the study of the full range of sexual diversity and the psychological benefits of queerness (see Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2004). Langdrige (2018) argues that the grounding of the LGBTQ social movement in a liberal model of social justice that emphasizes individual rights and responsibilities comes at a cost: “. . . the loss of an aggressive, politically engaged—or perhaps better still, politically enraged—queer subject who seeks to effect radical social change rather than assimilate to the hegemonic demands of individual ‘responsible’ citizenship”. In this audacious but compelling critique, Langdrige (2018) challenges the conventional wisdom on the perceived successes of the LGBTQ social movement.

This section in the volume reveals on the one hand the strides made in social psychology toward developing new paradigms to understand and advocate for social justice on the basis of gender and sexual diversity. Both Stewart and Zucker (2018) and Grabe (2018) highlight the link between social structure and psychological well-being, and they

stake out paradigms that I suspect will be highly generative for new research in the area of gender equality. On the other hand, Langdrige’s (2018) more critical contribution highlights the way in which dominant paradigms, well-intentioned to advocate for social justice for sexual diversity, may inadvertently subvert the radical potential of queer lives to critique culture.

My own position as a member of the sexual minority community and a scholar whose work actually seeks to integrate these perspectives is that we need not see these approaches as mutually exclusive. I believe it is both possible and scientifically responsible to produce knowledge that recognizes both the injustice of structural disadvantage and stigma and the injustice of a compulsory form of identity within the queer community. Langdrige’s (2018) challenge can be interpreted not necessarily as a repudiation of prior frameworks but as a call for a more complete analysis of the sexual minority experience: one that fully *analyzes resistance* to notions of normativity. In my own work, I aspire to accomplish just this end: to document the injustice of stigma as well as the creative response achieved through diverse constructions of identity and intimacy.

To return to the radical potential of social identity theory (e.g., Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), my perspective is that the study of gender, sexuality, and social justice benefits from a critical analysis of these social categories themselves. Anyone who engages with young people today and considers the dynamic way in which they are navigating labels related to gender and sexuality can attest to the contestation of existing social categories (e.g., Adams et al., 2014; Hammack & Cohler, 2009; Savin-Williams, 2005). I refuse to suggest that identities such as *man*, *woman*, *gay*, *lesbian*, and the like are irrelevant to today’s youth, for empirical evidence reveals that such labels continue to have meaning and significance for contemporary youth (e.g., Hammack et al., 2009; Russell, Clarke, & Clary, 2009). At the very minimum, social categories related to gender and sexuality are in a process of explosion, even in the case of heterosexuality with increasing numbers of youth identifying as either “heteroflexible” or “mostly straight” (e.g., Savin-Williams, Cash, McCormack, & Rieger, 2017; Thompson & Morgan, 2008; Ward, 2015).

Rather than taking the meaning and experience of gender or sexual identity for granted, social psychologists would do well to recognize that these identities, like all cultures and identities, are always in states of motion and that changes in the social

context command empirical inquiry to assess how lived experience shifts with changes in law, policy, and cultural discourse (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). So while at times I find the claims of Langdrige (2018) and others who critique our dominant paradigms for understanding psychology and sexual identity (e.g., Savin-Williams, 2001, 2005, 2016) overly expansive in the absence of sufficient empirical support, I think they appropriately force us to rethink our assumptions. It may not, as Langdrige (2018) suggests, serve the interest of social justice to implicitly advance a normalizing or assimilationist position through the assumptions many of our paradigms make about sexual diversity.

Similar to Grabe's (2018) views on methodological practice, my position is that we must anchor our theory and our advocacy in the grassroots efforts of gender and sexual minorities to advance a vision of justice and equality that responds to their needs. In the larger queer community I see diverse visions, and the community is by no means singular. As social psychologists, though, we must do a better job of broadening our paradigms to recognize and represent the radical potential of gender and sexual diversity to challenge existing social categories. We must avoid the common tendency in psychology to reify existing social categories, as if they were somehow reflective of the "natural" state of affairs (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Class, Poverty, Inequality

Notions of class and social position have been central to formulations of justice since ancient times (Johnston, 2011). Plato's conception of justice relied strongly on ideas about the "natural" status endowed various groups stratified according to social and economic position. Aristotle's emphasis on distributive justice highlighted relations of reciprocity only *within* particular social strata. And of course the political philosopher whose ideas inspired the entire concept of contemporary social justice—Karl Marx—focused almost *exclusively* on social class as the key source of social injustice in the industrial world. Marx and Engels (1848/2014) begin their enormously influential *Manifesto of the Communist Party* with this claim: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" (p. 219).

Social class is a defining concept across the social sciences, in fields like politics, economics, and sociology. So it is perhaps somewhat surprising that the psychological treatment of social class, even within social psychology, is relatively thin compared with

other markers of social identity such as race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual identity (Ostrove & Cole, 2003). Psychology, with its individualistic bias, has largely conspired with the dominant US narrative of meritocracy and the "American Dream" to obscure the significance of social class and economic position in individual development and well-being (Bullock, 2013).

Social psychology has gradually come to identify classism as among the pernicious ideologies that contribute to psychological injustice. Lott (2002) argues that classism functions not just through stereotypes and prejudice against the poor but also through cognitive and behavioral *distancing* processes in which low-income individuals are morally excluded from the larger community. Classism endures because it is deeply anchored in cultural beliefs that attribute poverty to individual, rather than structural, explanations (e.g., individual laziness rather than lack of opportunity; see Bullock, 1999). These beliefs are codified in dominant discourses about poverty and wealth—namely, the master narrative of the "American Dream" in which rapid social mobility across generations is credited to the social and economic system of the United States (Bullock, 2013; Bullock & Lott, 2010). The strong belief in meritocracy—that individual success can be largely attributed to merit, rather than being constrained by limited opportunity based on factors such as race, gender, and class—is also a core tenet of this master narrative (Bullock, 2013). The proliferation of these often unquestioned discourses in US culture provides legitimacy for the distancing processes of moral exclusion Lott (2002) proposes. While media representations might show sympathy for the plight of the poor, they do little to contextualize the experience of poverty (Bullock, Wyche, & Williams, 2001). The US educational system, riddled with inequities, supports the construction of distinct social classes and obstructs opportunity for most low-income individuals (Fine & Burns, 2003).

Discourses and narratives do not simply proliferate in societies, though. They are constructed and shaped through elite actors—namely, political leaders. In their contribution to this section of the volume, Bullock and Reppond (2018) take this elite political discourse as their point of departure for a critical social psychology of social class. The discourse of "takers" and "makers" promulgated by Republican leaders during the 2012 election, for example, legitimizes class disparities and economic inequalities by framing poverty and wealth in highly agentic terms. Bullock and Reppond's (2018)

analysis assumes an explicitly critical ontological perspective, identifying discourse about wealth and poverty as constitutive of economic injustice. They reveal the way in which the “takers” discourse (i.e., individuals who draw more in aid and services than they contribute) is rooted in dominant US ideology of individualism, meritocracy, and rapid social mobility (i.e., the “American Dream”). Bullock and Reppond (2018) argue for the dismantling of this ideology, rooted largely in mythology that benefits the wealthy and maintains inequities. Social psychological research can play a role in challenging this ideology by using empirical evidence to expose economic injustice. Such research ideally would lead to social policy change that recognizes the structural basis of poverty and the way in which opportunities and institutions might work for economic equality.

While Bullock and Reppond (2018) emphasize discourse, power, and social psychological processes such as stereotyping in the perpetuation of classism, Walker and Smith (2018) take a *relational* perspective on classism. They reveal the way in which class inequities are reproduced through processes of social exclusion. Walker and Smith (2018) propose that everyday human relationships serve as sites of social class construction. Drawing upon social theorist Pierre Bourdieu, they argue for a relational view of power: “Class hierarchies are created through a system of social relationships, in which we all play a part. Power is thus found in the domination of others—in the ability to have success at the expense of someone’s failure”.

Taken together, the chapters in this section of the volume highlight the way in which inequitable social positions are maintained through both language and social interaction, harkening back to critical social theories that emphasize the social construction of power and identity (e.g., Marx, 1859/1973). Central to Marx’s social theory was the notion that individual subjectivity is a product of the material basis of society. The economic structure of society determines the nature of social relations and individual psychology. Later social theorists such as George Herbert Mead (1934) would propose a more dynamic model of self-society co-constitution (i.e., symbolic interactionism; see also Blumer, 1969), but even he and other social theorists ascribed primacy to language as a central mediator of the social process. Volosinov, Vyktosky, and Bakhtin—architects of cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT)—fused Marx’s ideas with a similarly dynamic view as those of the US symbolic interactionists, arguing strongly for the ideological

basis of language (see especially Volosinov, 1929/1973). Foucault would later provide more evidence for the use of language and discourse to shape our understanding of social reality and social categories (e.g., Foucault, 1965, 1972, 1977, 1978). My point here is that the underlying argument of both Bullock and Reppond (2018) and Walker and Smith (2018) is part of a long tradition of social theory that highlights the way in which social relations are produced and reproduced through language and social interaction. This *critical ontological* perspective views individual agency as always constrained by both structural forces such as discourse and social policy that maintain inequality and possibilities for social interaction. The contributors in this section of the volume have slightly different notions of the path toward economic justice, but both sets of contributors are united in their view that greater awareness of classism, class privilege, and the structural root of poverty is needed as an essential step toward equality.

Globalization, Conflict, Inequality

The technological and cultural advances of the twentieth century ushered in a new era of human history—one in which trade, migration, and opportunities for mutual cultural influence expanded exponentially (Arnett, 2002; Larson, 2002). In this new heightened era of *globalization*, tensions have arisen which have largely been considered at the economic and political levels (Prilleltensky, 2012). For example, the 2004 Human Development Report of the UNDP emphasized the way in which globalization can create heightened political conflict as local economies and cultural values are threatened by exposure to global culture and markets.

Psychological perspectives on globalization have tended to emphasize issues of identity and conflict. For example, Arnett (2002) argues that globalization creates a new context for identity development, with many individuals developing *bicultural* identities (i.e., identities constructed in reference to both local and global cultures). Shifts in the life course, with delays in the assumption of adult roles compared with prior generations and the increasingly universal period of “emerging” adulthood (Arnett, 2000), may constitute a key psychological response to globalization (Arnett, 2002; Jensen & Arnett, 2012). Through exposure to new ideas and customs, globalization affords new possibilities for social and psychological understanding—new frames through which to make meaning, new opportunities, new technologies, and a new sense

of solidarity across human communities (Marsella, 2012). Globalization might challenge existing inequalities in societies, particularly with regard to gender (Jensen & Arnett, 2012), as global norms about gender equality challenge many patriarchal cultures.

These psychological consequences of globalization do not come without potential risk or cost, however. Individuals may experience cultural identity confusion as they are confronted with competing systems of meaning or social norms (Jensen & Arnett, 2012). Intergenerational tensions may occur in societies, as adolescents might be more likely than their parents to engage with the global culture through media (Arnett, 2002; Jensen & Arnett, 2012; Larson, 2002). To the extent that cultural and religious groups feel threatened or excluded from social life or political participation, they may be more likely to become extreme or even violent (e.g., Kinnvall, 2004; Sen, 2006; UNDP, 2004). Societies may become more fragmented, cultures eroded and replaced with hegemonic Western norms and values (Marsella, 2012). Economic inequality may become more pronounced, as the global capitalist marketplace takes hold in societies without adequate safeguards to manage disruptions to local economies (Marsella, 2012).

The social justice implications of globalization are significant and worthy of study among social psychologists. Our unique contribution lies in the ability to theorize and empirically document the link among social structure, individual subjectivity, and well-being. Embracing a critical ontological perspective, we have the potential to illuminate the way in which the cultural and economic challenges that globalization brings impact individual lives and social relations.

The five chapters in this section of the volume are intended to address global issues of cultural pluralism, decolonization, and enduring conflict. Liu and Pratto (2018) integrate two social psychological theories—critical junctures theory and power basis theory—to foreground considerations of power and history in the psychological study of social justice. Psychological theories have often overemphasized a decontextualized model of human agency. In this contribution, Liu and Pratto (2018) appropriately anchor their analysis of lives in the global context of history, power, and colonialism. They offer the case of New Zealand as a model to understand how critical junctures in history influence power, social relations, and self-understanding. Their contribution embodies a critical ontological perspective in which

individuals and groups are understood through the lens of history and social structure.

Migration and belonging are key concepts in the new global order. Discourses and policies of exclusion (best exemplified in the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the United States and Europe) compete with those intended to promote cultural pluralism and the benefits of globalization. Bhatia (2018) highlights the way in which a critical historical moment—9/11—has impacted social justice issues concerning the migration of South Asians to the United States. He highlights the strategies South Asian immigrants have used to navigate racialized discourses of citizenship and minority status. In this contribution, we see an *alliance with the subordinate* and an *analysis of resistance* that speak to the social psychology of social justice promoted throughout this book. Bhatia (2018) recognizes the diverse ways in which individuals negotiate marginality, distinguishing between *empowering* and *distancing* marginality, and he situates his analysis within the broader movement in social psychology to center a dynamic view of the social context. As a leader in the movement to understand how transnationalism and globalization impact individual lives (e.g., Bhatia, 2007a, 2007b), Bhatia is well positioned to call our attention to social justice in global perspective.

With its history of colonial expansion and its postwar social and economic policies that have opened borders, Europe has been a central site for our understanding of multiculturalism. European social psychology has also historically been more sensitive to issues of societal and collective influence on individual cognition and behavior (e.g., Moscovici, 1988; Tajfel, 1972, 1982; see Moghaddam, 1987). Chrysochoou's (2018) analysis of Europe raises a central issue in understanding social justice in the context of multiculturalism. Anchored precisely in the European social psychological tradition, she highlights the way in which distinct *social representations* of societal organization have implications for social justice in multicultural Europe. Recognizing the intersection of cultural identity and class membership, Chrysochoou (2018) suggests that societal organization that highlights cultural group membership over class may actually heighten tensions across ethno-cultural or religious identities, as those identities become the sole basis upon which migrants may organize to seek justice. In other words, the emphasis on societal divisions based on "culture" rather than class might exacerbate conflict by framing difference in cultural (and

possibly then irreconcilable) rather than economic terms. Echoing other perspectives in the volume (e.g., Bullock & Reppond, 2018), Chrysochoou's (2018) analysis reveals the way in which the discourse about social categories themselves has vital implications for social justice and can influence how privileged citizens view subordinate groups. Here we see not only a critical ontological perspective but also an alliance with the subordinate that seeks to illuminate the psychological injustices of particular social representations.

Globalization is by no means a neutral cultural or economic process, and theoretical perspectives that can accommodate the relative positions of groups and social actors are vital to the social psychological study of global social justice in the twenty-first century. Warren and Moghaddam's (2018) chapter on positioning theory and social justice offers just such a perspective, with its overview of the theory and its application to two national settings of heightened conflict: Afghanistan and Iraq. Positioning theory makes several assumptions rooted in the critical principles outlined in this chapter. Most notably, the theory's assumptions about the relationship among social structure (or "normative systems"), language, and social reality can be linked to a critical ontological perspective on persons and contexts. Social and psychological realities emerge within the constraints of governing institutions and social systems through the appropriation of narratives and discourses (see also Hammack, 2008; Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Hammack & Toolis, 2015, 2016). Unique to positioning theory is a concern with the concepts of *rights* and *duties*, which Warren and Moghaddam (2018) highlight and which nicely links this theoretical approach to other fields concerned with justice, such as political philosophy and political science. Their rich application of the theory to Afghanistan and Iraq reveals the way in which the political positioning of the wars there created contested storylines about rights and duties in these contexts.

The final chapter in this section of the volume calls upon social representations theory (e.g., Moscovici, 1988) to examine war and military intervention in the twenty-first century. Cohrs and O'Dwyer (2018) challenge the notion that the motivation for war is rooted "in the minds of men," as some social psychological research that focuses on individual attitudes toward war might suggest. They illustrate the way in which war and military intervention are rooted in *social representations* constructed by elite and media discourse. Embodying

a critical ontological perspective, they argue that the mindset to engage in war and armed conflict develops in a social context in which military intervention is framed as necessary and just. They also offer an analysis of resistance, positing an alternative set of social representations that can construct "defenses of peace."

Intervention, Advocacy, Social Policy

The final section of the volume explicitly addresses the problem of *action* in response to social injustice. How might we, as social psychologists, intervene and advocate for social justice? Three of the four chapters in this section are anchored in what has arguably been one of the most promoted social psychological intervention strategies: *inter-group contact*.

Everywhere on earth we find a condition of separateness among groups. People mate with their own kind. They eat, play, reside in homogeneous clusters. They visit with their own kind, and prefer to worship together. . . . Once this separatism exists, however, the ground is laid for all sorts of psychological elaboration. People who stay separate have few channels of communication. They easily exaggerate the degree of difference between groups, and readily misunderstand the grounds for it. And, perhaps most important of all, the separateness may lead to genuine conflicts of interests, as well as to many imaginary conflicts.

(Allport, 1954, pp. 17, 19)

Writing and conducting research in an era of formal racial segregation in the United States, Gordon Allport (1954) famously viewed the root cause of prejudice as the *separation of groups*. While he viewed prejudice as a normal psychological outgrowth of segregation and social categorization, Allport recognized it as the psychological mechanism through which irrational antagonism and hostilities endured. Hence, in his view, a core aim of social psychology is to thwart this process and intervene in the separation of groups. *Contact* between groups, he theorized, might reduce the prejudices that arise in a context of separation and, in turn, foster a culture opposed to segregation.

Allport developed his ideas precisely at a cultural turning point for race relations and legal segregation in the United States: the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* decision that ruled segregation unconstitutional was handed down the same year that *The Nature of Prejudice* was published (1954). And of course the Civil Rights Movement raised

considerable visibility to the injustice of racism and segregation during this era. It is difficult, therefore, to disentangle the impact of social policy change, movement visibility, and actual intergroup contact efforts on a shifting cultural narrative of race relations at the time. But Allport's contact hypothesis took on a life of its own and emerged as one of the leading intervention approaches for social psychology in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (e.g., Amir, 1969; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

One setting in which intergroup contact has been extensively promoted and studied is in intractable political conflict, such as Northern Ireland (e.g., Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006), South Africa (e.g., Dixon & Reicher, 1997), and Israel/Palestine (e.g., Abu-Nimer, 1999; Hammack, Pilecki, & Merrilees, 2014; Maoz, 2000a, 2000b; Ross, 2014). Such efforts have developed considerably since Allport's (1954) original articulation of the contact hypothesis, particularly since the basic conditions that Allport proposed for optimal effectiveness (e.g., equality between groups) are often unmet. Israeli social psychologist Ifat Maoz has devoted much of her career to studying these efforts among Israelis and Palestinians, and her chapter in this section of the volume reviews the distinct models of intergroup contact currently in use. Beyond prejudice reduction, though, Maoz (2018) suggests that different models of contact may be more likely to promote social justice between groups in asymmetric conflict. For example, the traditional "coexistence" model which has been dominant in intergroup encounters between Israelis and Palestinians emphasizes prejudice reduction and cross-group friendship but does not address issues of history and power asymmetry, which critics have argued favors the status quo of the Israeli military occupation (e.g., Bekerman & Maoz, 2005; Hammack, 2009, 2011a; Suleiman, 2004). A distinct "confrontational" model developed in Israel and rooted in social identity theory has sought to offer an alternative approach that can better address issues of power and raise awareness of privilege among the dominant group (Halabi & Sonnenschein, 2004; Hammack & Pilecki, 2015). Maoz (2018) highlights these and other approaches to social psychological intervention in conflict settings, revealing pitfalls and possibilities of such efforts to work for social change.

In 2005, the contact hypothesis was called into question in a critical analysis of its assumptions

and aims. Dixon and colleagues (2005) offer what they call a "reality check" for the contact hypothesis, arguing against the overly optimistic attitude of most social psychologists. They suggest that the optimal contact strategy is utopian in its vision, neglects participants' own understandings of contact, and is rooted in an individualistic notion of conflict and prejudice. They question whether prejudice reduction ought really to be the outcome of study, rather than outcomes more directly related to social action or social justice (see also Dixon et al., 2012).

Durrheim and Dixon's (2018) chapter in this section of the volume extends and updates this analysis, providing a historical analysis of the origins of the contact hypothesis (especially Clark's [1953] articulation). They posit that contact was indeed originally conceived as an important social justice tool in the civil rights era but that the relative emphasis on individual prejudice reduction and interpersonal outcomes such as friendship has obscured a social justice lens that could foreground issues of power (Durrheim & Dixon, 2018). They note that researchers studying actual contact interventions in conflict settings, rather than those studying contact in rarefied laboratory settings or solely through self-report methods, have been able to study issues of power (e.g., Bekerman, 2007; Halabi & Sonnenschein, 2004; Hammack & Pilecki, 2015; Maoz, 2000; Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). They call for a renewed study of the *substance* of intergroup contact, to understand the way in which such efforts influence processes of meaning making and power relations between groups.

The approach to *intergroup dialogue* which Nagda, Gurin, and colleagues have developed and promoted for some time has actually developed independently from this line of contact research. Their notion of intergroup dialogue has been explicitly rooted in a social justice educational perspective from the start (e.g., Gurin, Nagda, & Zuniga, 2013; Nagda, 2006; Nagda & Gurin, 2007). Although they recognize psychological change (e.g., prejudice reduction) and relationship formation (i.e., friendship) as desirable outcomes, Nagda, Gurin, and Rodríguez (2018) highlight the way in which intergroup dialogue seeks to motivate collective action for social justice. Unlike many contact efforts which have a less formal pedagogy, intergroup dialogue has a specific curriculum intended to educate about difference and injustice. Nagda and colleagues (2018) outline this curriculum and also present findings from a multi-site field experiment to illustrate the

potential of intergroup dialogue to work for social justice. Their approach draws upon contact theory, social identity theory, and critical pedagogy (e.g., Freire, 1970/2000), thus providing an integrative perspective on intervention for social justice.

The final contribution to the volume offers a different model for how social psychologists can work for social justice through direct social policy influence. Greg Herek was at the forefront of social psychological research on heterosexism and homophobia in the 1980s when he situated the corresponding attitudes of these ideologies within the concept of prejudice (e.g., Herek, 1984, 1988, 1990). He was thus a leader in the movement to shift the lens of stigma away from the sexual minority person, toward a heterosexist society that created and legitimized homophobia and direct violence against sexual minorities (e.g., Herek, 1990, 1998, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, 2009). Beyond this significant contribution, though, Herek has been a leader among social psychologists who have penetrated the legal system to use psychological evidence to advocate for social justice for sexual minorities. Herek's contribution to the volume provides a narrative of his advocacy for sexual minority rights and legal recognition, focusing especially on the 2010 federal case that overturned California's Proposition 8 and paved the way for marriage equality across the nation (Hammack & Windell, 2011). Herek provides an invaluable blueprint for the would-be scientific activist, to better understand how the legal system can be influenced with the empirical evidence that social psychologists typically collect.

The scientific advocacy of social psychologists like Herek—along with others such as Craig Haney who has advocated for prison reform, Michelle Fine who has advocated for educational reform, and many others—is a model for our own disciplinary practice. Such a practice is at the core of a commitment to public science—a knowledge production industry committed not to personal advancement but to actual social change in the interest of social justice. We who are committed to this model of activist scholarship are part of a long and distinguished line of justice-oriented social psychologists, from Marie Jahoda, Kenneth Clark, Kurt Lewin, Gordon Allport, to Herb Kelman, Brewster Smith, Rhoda Unger, Michelle Fine, Craig Haney, Greg Herek, and so many others today. Now more than ever, social psychology must take up its call to produce knowledge that can fully be “of use” to society

(Fine & Barreras, 2001). This volume represents one attempt to synthesize approaches, consolidate commitments, and inspire a new generation of social psychologists to ask bold questions of deep social relevance, use diverse methods and epistemologies, and construct professional identities oriented toward practical social change for social justice.

Social Justice: An Imperative of the Present

This volume appears at a time in history in which the core problems that motivated the birth of social psychology—ethnic nationalism, racism and anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and other threats to democracy—have returned to prominence. The election of Donald J. Trump in the United States, part of a larger movement across the globe characterized by rising nationalism and social policies of exclusion, reminds us that history does not always take the form of a linear narrative. The contemporary context for social psychological science, then, is one in which a once-repudiated rhetoric of social hierarchy has returned, even if at times veiled through the rhetoric of “security.” The ethic of cultural pluralism that came to define postwar institutions such as the United Nations now competes with this revival of insular nationalism and protectionism. And so social psychology finds itself in a new context of extraordinary social relevance. The illusion that science, empiricism, or rationality would prevail—certainly the basic assumption of all the social sciences that flourished in the twentieth century—is no more. What, then, are we to do?

The chapters in this volume envision a new, more critical and less naïve vision for social psychology. These chapters are defined first and foremost with a key principle grounded in the empirical legacy of the twentieth century: the principle of *critical ontologies*—the notion that individual subjectivity is at some level a slave to the social structure and its accompanying discourse about social categories. This principle does not suggest that human agency is illusory, but it does emphasize the way in which agency is constrained especially by the force of institutions, social policies, and discourses (Hammack & Toolis, 2016). The chapters in the volume are also defined by the *normative stance* toward injustice they take. It is not ideological to suggest that fairness and equality characterize the nature of social relations and that societies codify a commitment to social justice in law and custom; it is rational, humane, and democratic. But it is a

position we must explicitly take if we are to fully be of use to society. With this position inevitably comes an *alliance with the subordinate* in settings of injustice—a decision to use our skills to produce knowledge that actually *benefits* those who experience injustice. And in analyzing and documenting how individuals and groups *resist* injustice, we do a service to those in the midst of new and active struggle. We publish in scientific journals and prestigious academic presses because we recognize that we are more effective advocates when we achieve credibility through the rigor of scientific practice. But we do not, or should not, stop here. We must strive, even if ever evading us, for the most effective strategy to communicate to those in power, and to the broader culture, our wisdom and our expertise, as well as the wisdom and expertise of those experiencing injustice.

The present historical moment affords us a special opportunity—the opportunity to recognize our renewed relevance in a context of resurgent threats to the democratic social order, our commitment to the ideals of social justice, and our passion to use scientific inquiry toward benevolent social ends. Our times may be “revolting” (Fine, 2012), but if our energy is channeled away from despair, if our gaze is cast not in horror at this revulsion but rather toward the inspiring acts of resistance and rebellion that give us hope, we can find meaning and purpose in our quest for a just society.

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